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Chairs Assembly and Directors Forum 2014

Key Issues for Governance Reform: Consultation with the AI movement

Amnesty International members and staff only

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To: Section and structure chairs
Section and structure directors

Amnesty International
International Secretariat

From: Governance Committee

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SUMMARY

The purpose of this paper is to set forth the proposed process by which Decision 7 of the 2013 International Council Meeting on the Governance Reform should be implemented. That Decision instructed the International Board to conduct a review of whether our current governance system is fit for purpose, and to develop proposals to improve Amnesty International's international governance. The International Board have asked the Governance Committee to make an assessment of Amnesty International's current governance situation, especially as to where shortcomings need attention in our decision-making and accountability mechanisms; this paper presents the findings of this assessment for discussion and debate during the Chairs Assembly and Directors Forum 2014. This paper is a Chairs Assembly and Directors Forum and a consultation paper at the same time.

DISTRIBUTION

This is an internal document, distributed to section chairs and directors.

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

Please ensure this document is brought to the attention of the Chair and Director of your section or structure.

From: International Board

To: S/s

Dear friends,

At the 2013 International Council Meeting (ICM) the need for reform of Amnesty International's global governance was the focus of several resolutions. Consequently there were a number of discussions about governance reform which resulted in a joint resolution of the (then) International Executive Committee and several sections, adopted unanimously by the ICM in Decision 7. The International Board believes that this provides strong support for our focus on reforming Amnesty's governance structures, procedures and responsibilities, and improving our decision-making and accountability mechanisms. The sense of urgency is great, for many reasons including:

1. The anticipated growth of our international organization with hopefully many more members and sections, leading to a larger scale for our governance setup;
2. The reform of the operational organization of the International Secretariat through the Global Transition Programme;
3. The increasing scrutiny of International Non-Governmental Organizations as to the quality of their governance;
4. Our need to be effective in our human rights work and in ensuring that we acquire and use necessary resources responsibly;
5. And last but not least, the need to address shortcomings perceived by people in our movement.

Of course we fully realize that while having a shared vision on the need for reform is one thing, having a shared vision as to exactly which reforms are needed is another. We want to engage in a joint process of exploration by different parts of the movement to develop a shared understanding of our challenges and a shared approach to reform. To facilitate this, the International Board has asked the Governance Committee to make – as a first step – a robust assessment of our current governance situation, especially identifying shortcomings that need attention in our decision-making and accountability mechanisms.

You will find the analysis of the Governance Committee attached. We would now like to consult with you. Please note that at this stage we would like you to reflect on the issues that are described and share possible suggestions or concerns with us. We are not asking for final decisions on your part, and no formal positions are sought. For the moment we are more interested in the journey than in the destination, so to speak.

The Governance Committee is keen to receive your input and at a later stage will come up with concrete proposals informed by your responses, which will be offered to the movement for consideration and ultimately decision.

We look forward to your responses and to discussing this with chairs and directors at the Chairs Assembly and Directors Forum in June.

Best wishes

The International Board

Key Issues for Governance Reform: Consultation with the AI movement

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1 INTRODUCTION TO THE GOVERNANCE REFORM PROCESS

At the International Council Meeting (ICM) in 2013, Amnesty International (AI) instructed the International Board to conduct a review of whether our current governance system is fit for purpose, and to develop proposals to improve AI's international governance (see ICM 2013 Decision 7, text at Annex 1).

At the heart of this reform process is the quest for substantially improved governance. This represents the latest step in what has been a long and ongoing process for Amnesty, with many governance reviews and reform attempts over the past several decades. While we have made some important governance improvements (like the development of the Core Standards), more often we have made only small changes in a piecemeal fashion, and have failed to make strategic and robust reforms in areas where we need them. As a result, our governance system has remained fundamentally unchanged for decades, and today it is burdened with challenges including weak accountability mechanisms, fragmented and unwieldy decision-making processes, barriers to effective participation, and inadequate support and empowerment of actors with governance responsibilities. Meanwhile, much about our organization and the world we operate in has changed.

At all times during this governance reform process, we must remember that we are accountable for the fulfilment of AI's vision and mission:

“AI's vision is of a world in which every person enjoys all of the human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments. In pursuit of this vision, AI's mission is to undertake research and action focused on preventing and ending grave abuses of these rights.”¹

The ultimate responsibility of our governance leaders is to ensure that everything we do furthers this vision and mission, and it is respectful of AI's core values². The fulfilment of our vision, mission and values requires an organization that is agile, efficient, expert, respected, transparent, well-resourced, effective, sustainable, inspiring, inclusive, strategic, and credible.

This reform process represents a key opportunity to 'think big' and do better, and we must use it. There are many reasons that good governance is a priority for us, and the most important is that the human rights challenges facing us allow no room for governance systems that harbour waste and stagnation. Good governance is key to realising our goals of preventing and ending grave abuses of human rights and having a truly global impact. We need to ensure that: our global governance and decision making bodies can drive strategic decisions with speed, effectiveness, consistency and legitimacy; we are accountable to and transparent with our stakeholders for how we use our resources; we are able to grow and generate additional resources to maximise our human rights impact; and our governance is able to support our operations

¹ AI's Statute, Article 1.

² AI's Statute, Article 2, Core Values: “AI forms a global community of human rights defenders with the principles of international solidarity, effective action for the individual victim, global coverage, the universality and indivisibility of human rights, impartiality and independence, and democracy and mutual respect.”

delivered through the Global Transition Programme.

The International Board has tasked its Governance Committee (GovCom) to work on analyzing our current governance system and developing proposals for improvement in accordance with Decision 7 of the 2013 ICM. Ultimately, these proposals will come to the International Board before then being put to the ICM as appropriate.

Accordingly the GovCom has considered the criteria that AI should use as it considers proposals for reform. We agree that our governance system must be **democratic** and that it must make **efficient** use of our limited resources (including money, time, and people). In AI – just as in other organizations and contexts – an emphasis on either one of these criteria alone can undermine the other. Therefore, any proposals for reform must reflect the importance of both.

In addition, the GovCom proposes that our governance system must:

- Support coherent, integrated, effective and accountable decision-making
- Require and support consistent attention to our human rights policies, plans, and goals, as well as our operational and financial health
- Include a body that is capable of performing the crucial governance functions of an Assembly or General Meeting, including effective strategy development, performance and budget oversight and elections mechanisms
- Be participatory, representative, and inclusive
- Have clear accountability lines and effective accountability mechanisms
- Ensure that decisions are costed and prioritized
- Account for gender and our internal diversity while encouraging a global perspective on governance and shared responsibility for our collective impact
- Use processes and voting systems that reflect our core values and allow for participation by members from all parts of the organization.

2 THE PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THIS CONSULTATION

The purpose of this document is to begin a consultation with the movement. It provides information and analysis about our current governance system, and poses a range of questions intended to give sections and structures (s/s) an opportunity to help shape a shared understanding of what we need to do and how we might do it. Thoughtful participation from across the movement is integral to the success of this reform process, and we encourage all s/s to share their perspectives and ideas.

The total structure of AI's governance worldwide is large and complex, and we want to be clear about the scope of this consultation. This consultation focuses on four interconnected areas where we see the greatest need for change: 1) our decision-making model; 2) the ICM and Chairs' Assembly; 3) internal accountability, and 4) our Statute. There is other ongoing governance work, not included here, on which we may in the future consult in other ways.³ There are also

³ For example, the implementation of the Core Standards; consideration of the rights and responsibilities of the New

governance issues that we have chosen not to include in this consultation, for reasons of manageability and ensuring our focus that is on what we see as the key areas for immediate improvement.⁴ However, we may make recommendations for further governance improvements on these and other issues in the future.

GovCom has agreed on several key values and priorities that underlie its approach to this governance reform process. In particular, we share:

- A commitment to an open-minded, visionary, and robust consideration of how we can best govern ourselves in a way that reflects our core values, adheres to AI's seven governance principles⁵, and maximizes our human rights impact.
- A commitment to increasing our organizational effectiveness and enhancing our ability to act as 'One Amnesty'.
- A focus on the governance implications of the Global Transition Program and 'moving closer to the ground'.
- Openness to learning from our global and national governance experiences, and from the experiences of other organizations.
- A commitment to a process that combines progressive leadership from the International Board and GovCom with meaningful participation from stakeholders from across the organization.
- An understanding that a key factor for the success of the consultation will be a widely shared sense across the movement that the reforms passed will strengthen our democracy, accountability, and effectiveness.
- A clear analysis and understanding of which governance functions properly reside with which parts of the organization, and of our mutual obligations and accountability⁶.
- A commitment to building a governance model that makes the best use of the finite resources we have for human rights work.

This document forms the centrepiece of the consultation process, and will form the basis for governance reform discussions at the Chairs' Assembly and Directors' Forum in June 2014.

We have prepared supporting information to accompany this consultation document:

- Annex 2 contains more detailed factual background information on the current international governance arrangements of AI.
- Annex 3(i) provides a detailed summary overview of the recommendations from previous governance reviews over the last ten years, with an emphasis on those

Forms of Presence in our governance system; the development of a common global membership definition, etc.

⁴ For example, we have opted not to consult on issues of improvements to International Board practices, external accountability, and participation of external rights-holders (however, we have recommended that rights-holders play a key role in our strategic goal-setting process).

⁵ As agreed at the ICM 2009 Decision 10: impact focus; inclusiveness; diversity and gender; quality participation; transparency; accountability; effectiveness and efficiency.

⁶ As defined in Decision 16, 2011 ICM and illustrated in the table in that document.

recommendations not yet implemented fully, or at all, yet still deemed relevant and valuable.

- Annex 3(ii) presents a summary of key findings from the official evaluations of the last three ICMs in 2009, 2011 and 2013.
- Annex 4 presents a table with an overview of key statistics related to membership, voting rights, ICM delegates, and contribution to global assessment (broken down and presented by s/s, international membership, and by region).

GovCom will offer regional videoconferences or teleconferences for s/s that wish to discuss this in further depth with us and with one another. We will also hold targeted consultations with specific stakeholders. Finally, we will investigate a varied sample of governance models used in other organizations from which we may be able to learn and adapt ideas. We will give a summary report of all of the information and feedback we receive through these various processes to the movement, and will take it all into consideration when drafting governance reform proposals.

This consultation paper assumes consultation participants' basic knowledge of the key actors, meetings, and processes of AI's international governance system. However, we have included some general information at Annex 2 for those who may find it useful.

If you require further information in order to participate in this consultation, please see pages 17-18 of this document for contact information.

3 OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF AI'S INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM

This section offers information and analysis regarding four key areas where AI's international governance system needs improvement: 1) our main governance meetings (the ICM and the Chairs' Assembly); 2) our decision-making practices (including the resolutions process, our system of voting, and distribution of power); 3) internal accountability; and 4) other changes to the Statute (including the sections on the Membership Appeals Committee). There are important connections between these four areas.

3.1 THE ICM AND THE CHAIRS' ASSEMBLY

This section examines the question at the heart of the governance reform Decision 7 of the 2013 ICM, namely: **Is the ICM 'fit for purpose' as AI's highest governance body, and how can it be improved?** Annex 3(ii) offers a summary of the evaluations of the past three ICMs, which is intended to support this discussion. Although, in this document, decision-making and accountability are discussed separately, they are closely related to this topic, and ultimately we will probably make integrated proposals for improvement.

The ICM works in conjunction with the Chairs' Assembly⁷. The Chairs' Assembly has become

⁷ The Chairs' Assembly (previously the Chairs Forum) is defined in 2009 ICM Decision 10 as: "AI's Global Governance Meeting [which] has the main task of agreeing the contributions of all AI entities to AI's global strategic objectives and of supporting the Board (previously IEC) in overseeing the performance of global management, and of holding all AI entities accountable to each other as appropriate for delivery of AI's global strategies. The Global Governance meeting is also a venue for consultation and dialogue, leadership skill development, and cooperation across AI

an increasingly important forum for discussion, accountability, skill-building, and networking, and it also plays an important role as a significant governance check-point, part of the way between ICMs. For this reason, even though this document focuses heavily on the ICM, any discussion of, or reforms to, the ICM should take into account the Chairs' Assembly and how it may also need to be reformed in tandem, in order to ensure the strongest possible governance system.

What are some key strengths and benefits of the ICM?

The ICM has a number of recognised and valued strengths and benefits:

- It is a great networking opportunity that enables representatives from different s/s to build and maintain relationships
- It is a platform for capacity-building, through exchange of experience, skill-sharing, training and learning
- It strengthens communal identity and the sense of belonging to 'One Amnesty'
- It is inspiring, engaging and invigorating
- It helps build shared understanding about our organization and our work
- It involves participation of people from across the movement, which allows our discussions, ideas, and decisions to reflect our diversity
- It brings together many key actors: s/s Chairs, s/s Directors, members, the International Board, other committees and governing bodies, global managers and staff, and outside stakeholders
- It brings together many human rights experts and experts in other relevant fields
- It manifests and renews important commitments
- It exercises accountability and takes difficult decisions
- It provides a forum for debates that make our strategic decisions more legitimate
- It can push AI to make critical policy decisions and to move into new areas of work
- It gives s/s and international members a chance to influence the global agenda and to communicate directly with one another and with global leadership.

A key challenge for our governance reform will be deciding how to preserve these strengths, while addressing the major weaknesses in the ICM.

What are some weaknesses and disadvantages of the ICM?

The overarching weakness of the ICM is its inability to function effectively as an Assembly or General Meeting. Specifically, it has shown a limited ability to fulfil its two major governance purposes:

- acting as the highest decision-making body, making integrated and coherent decisions that guide AI's global strategy, policy and priorities; and
- holding s/s, the International Secretariat (IS) and other bodies accountable; for effective delivery of results and efficient use of resources; to supporters and

entities."

stakeholders.

There are several factors that contribute to this (some of which are discussed in the accountability section below). One factor is that the ICM often **lacks a global perspective on governance**, because the ICM is attended, and decisions are made, by national delegations bringing with them primarily section-level experiences and perspectives. These perspectives are essential to our decision-making (and are not in themselves problematic), but it can be challenging to reconcile dozens of national perspectives with the overarching need for global cooperation, strategy, accountability, and vision. The ICM should be a body that achieves both proper consideration and integration of local perspectives, and a commitment by all participants to take collective responsibility for AI's global functioning and impact.

Another factor is the **time lapse between ICMs**. While there are advantages to a biennial ICM, one disadvantage is that it reduces the ability of the ICM to act as a monitoring and accountability body.

A further factor is the **profile of ICM delegates**. No consistent criteria are applied to determine what skills, experience, and knowledge ICM delegates should have in order to attend, nor do we consistently ensure that delegations are appropriately diverse.

Related to this is **discontinuity in delegates**. Most of the delegates are participating in the ICM for the first time⁸, and they often do not have the necessary experience to participate actively and meaningfully in the decision-making process⁹. Further, the organization often loses the value of their experience after the ICM ends.

Another weakness is the burden associated with the **preparation for the ICM**. The resolutions process is long and bureaucratic, and the quantity and length of ICM documents can be difficult for delegations to manage, particularly those with limited resources and capacity.

Many delegations' participation is hindered by **language barriers**, particularly in regard to: last-minute translation of information; issues with simultaneous translation; informal activities outside plenary and working parties (such as interviews and drafting parties); and reading last-

⁸ The statistics on percentage of delegates who are first-time attendees show that it is a high proportion, and has been rising in recent ICMs: in 2009, 41% of delegates were first-time attendees: this rose to 51% in 2011 and 67% in 2013.

⁹ AI's decision-making process is based on resolutions. Members of s/s or the International Board can propose changes in our policies, procedures and even our vision and mission; these changes come in the form of resolutions to the ICM. Resolutions are discussed, possibly changed, and voted on first at a working party and then at a plenary session. Amendments to resolutions can be proposed up until the last moment before concluding the discussion of a resolution, but must be cleared before the resolution can be tabled. A working party is an opportunity for initial discussion, for everyone's concerns to be brought out. All participants at the ICM can participate and they are free to choose which working party to attend. Working parties try to operate by consensus, but often vote is needed. If a resolution is approved by the working party it progresses to the plenary as a recommendation. The final plenary is the place where the final decisions are taken; once a resolution has been approved it becomes a decision.

minute papers.

Finally, there is **limited support or opportunity for discussion** leading up to the ICM, which can result in inefficient use of ICM time, and important discussions being rushed. This also reduces the extent to which the ICM can act as a “human rights brain trust” of experts from around the world.

Other factors to consider

There are at a few more additional factors to consider which do not necessarily fall under the headings of strengths or weaknesses, and which are important elements in any reform process: **cost**,¹⁰ **length**,¹¹ and **number of delegates**¹² are among them. While the appropriate numbers in these categories are dependent on other decisions we make about the ICM (for example, how frequently it should meet, what changes we should make to the Chairs’ Assembly, how many delegates attend, and what pre-ICM discussion support we provide), we should be aware that it is likely that the already significant costs of the ICM will increase as AI expands its global presence, unless we make changes that will maintain or reduce the current cost level.

Any reform process aimed at improving the ICM and Chairs Assembly will also need to consider the role of the **Preparatory Committee** (PrepCom)¹³ and the **Chairs Forum Steering Committee** (CFSC),¹⁴ and changes we might make to either or both of them.

3.2 DECISION-MAKING

This section addresses three areas related to decision-making that we believe need close examination as part of this reform process: the distribution of power in AI; our system of voting rights; and our resolutions-based decision-making model.

¹⁰ The total costs of the last three ICMs have totalled: 2009 - £1,015,595; 2011 - £877,478; 2013 - £670,421. These totals include centrally budgeted costs, and additional costs allocated within/across the movement.

¹¹ The ICM is usually between 5 and 7 days long, and not all activities are strictly governance-related.

¹² The number of delegates involved in the decision-making process is over 300 which, while ensuring representation, experience, and diversity among participants, involves significant costs and can pose challenges in reaching decisions.

¹³ The PrepCom’s main role is to ensure the effective organization of the ICM, and it can recommend consolidation of resolutions. Its members are: the chair and alternate chair of the ICM - elected by the preceding ICM; the working party chairs; a member of the International Board; a representative of the Secretary General; the ICM Organizer and the ICM Agenda Coordinator.

¹⁴ The CSFC’s main role is to ensure that mechanisms and procedures are put in place in order that the Chairs Forum can implement its role (please refer to Annex 2). Its members are: members elected at the Chairs Assembly, a representative of the International Board, and the Chairperson of the International Council.

Distribution of power

Power is a fundamental issue in any review of governance. As a human rights organization that promotes participation, diversity, and transparency, we must speak about power dynamics openly. Power and influence are associated with factors such as resources, size, votes, and decision making authority; diversity; access to information; competence; reputation; language and communications; and access to technology. All of these elements play a role in the culture of democracy in the organization, with various power relationships at play. The obvious ones are the dynamics between the IS and the sections; the funding sections and the funded sections; and large sections and small sections. But there are many other elements, such as post-colonial influences; past tensions between sections; and past failures within sections.

Power issues will always be present, but what is important is to be aware of them, to identify conflicts of interest and different agendas, and to be openly committed to having as 'level a playing field' as possible.

Voting rights

Only representatives of s/s and the international membership have the right to vote at the IC, where voting rights are weighted to reflect the number or groups of members in any specific country or of the international membership¹⁵. Only sections that have paid their annual assessment for the previous two financial years are entitled to vote at the IC. If an AI entity has not provided the agreed annual financial reports and audited accounts to the IS within one month of the final date for submission, that entity is not entitled to vote at the IC. In practice, the IC has rarely invoked this provision, and, on a recommendation from the International Board, has granted a waiver to sections not in compliance with these rules. While the Chairs Forum is an advisory body, the polls taken in discussions are on the basis of 'one country, one vote', except for decisions referred to the Chairs Forum by the IC, where the same voting rights as existed at the preceding IC apply.

There are many issues and options to consider with respect to our voting model. As Annex 4 shows, there are different ways of viewing our current model. It is interesting to note that as votes are currently held the voting proportions do not directly correspond with the percentage of the global membership located in any given s/s. S/s from the global north hold more votes than s/s from the global south on average, and cumulatively they hold an absolute majority. However, funding s/s also have a disproportionately low percentage of the total votes when compared with their proportion of the global membership. Furthermore, the handful of s/s that contribute the majority of the financial resources have a small percentage of the total voting power (which is probably appropriate given our aims and values, as well as the social justice issues associated with the global distribution of wealth; nevertheless, we should consider how to address the governance implications of this). Finally, some stakeholders have no voting rights at all.¹⁶

¹⁵ Please refer to Articles 18 and 19 of AI's Statute.

¹⁶ These include the New Forms of Presence. The governance rights and responsibilities of these entities, including

Our current voting model is a proportional representation model, though as mentioned above, the voting proportions do not directly correspond with the percentage of the global membership located in any given s/s. Rather, we have built the model using calculations and limitations intended to achieve other important aims such as equity, participation, reduced costs, and manageability. We could continue with the system we have (or some modified version of it), or we could adopt another option. For instance, in the past we have considered a one-s/s, one vote model. We could also consider a model that offers different voting options, depending on the nature of the decision to be made. We might also address voting imbalances through changes to other decision-making practices (for example, by requiring more than an absolute majority of votes for a wider variety of decisions). There are many options available, and we should think carefully about what voting arrangement best reflects our values and will help us function fairly and effectively.

Resolutions-based decision making model

Currently we make all major global governance decisions through ICM resolutions that are submitted by s/s or the International Board. This standard tool is used to present many disparate priorities and issues for decision. We use resolutions to frame our strategic plan decisions, as well as for policy decisions, organizational issues, finance, and other matters.

There are some advantages to this model, the most significant being that it allows actors from across the organization to put ideas forward for consideration. This encourages diversity, innovation, debate, and engagement. The democratic approval of proposals can also create legitimacy, enthusiasm, and a sense of ownership, as we implement decisions.

However, there are several serious weaknesses with the resolutions-based model. One is that there is **insufficient focus on the global/strategic relevance** of the issues proposed for debate, as well as on how they fit into the larger context of our finances, capacity, and 'added value'.

We have faced particular challenges with the **Human Rights Strategy Working Party**. This working party has a valid policy development function that should be retained somehow in our reformed model. However, it is often used as a way to import new work, in a way that undermines our strategic planning process, frustrates many ICM participants, and consumes scarce time and resources. We must have the self-discipline and commitment to our strategic plans to move on from this practice. However, we must also recognize that putting forward resolutions is often the only way that s/s can reliably put particular issues onto the global agenda for discussion. Our reformed model should provide meaningful spaces for discussion and forward-thinking debate that can feed into decision-making at the appropriate times.

As noted in the section about the ICM, this model also provides **insufficient opportunity and support for inclusive and transparent discussion** about and development of ideas outside the formal working party and plenary settings. A related issue is that this model rarely supports a meaningful **discussion of multiple options or alternatives** for dealing with any given issue.

their voting rights, are the subject of another working group of the GovCom.

Finally, our approach to decision making can drive a 'stepped' approach to issues, calling first for a study and ultimately a move in to new areas of work. While this often happens in the spirit of consensus or of avoiding calling for new campaign work at the wrong time, it can be a form of **'lowest common denominator' decision making**, and it does not adequately acknowledge the resources that such decisions divert from other work.

3.3 ACCOUNTABILITY

What do we mean by accountability?

Amnesty has defined accountability¹⁷ as a holistic concept embracing legal and financial obligations, as well as social and ethical 'mission' responsibilities. 'Accountability' refers to different responsibilities on the part of, and between, stakeholders. It is complex and operates at multiple levels and along different axes. Essentially, our accountability practices must ensure two things: that collectively we are doing what we should be doing as an organization; and that within our organization the right people are doing the right things in the right ways.

It is important to distinguish between internal and external accountability: internal accountability refers to the accountability relations amongst internal AI bodies and actors, while external accountability refers to our organizational accountability to rights-holders, partners, donors and society in general. The INGO Accountability Charter is one of the main mechanisms to ensure that AI is accountable to its external stakeholders. This consultation document will focus on internal accountability at the international level.

What does internal accountability look like in AI?

The main internal lines of accountability in AI are presented in the graph and text in Annex 2. It is important to note that here we are discussing accountability across the movement including of s/s, the International Board, and the Secretary General (SG) among others.

We use a variety of accountability mechanisms, depending on the particular line of accountability:

- *S/s accountability to the International Council (IC¹⁸):* S/s are accountable to the IC through the Standard Action Reports and financial reports, and will be accountable through the Core Standards. The IS is responsible for providing the infrastructure to collate and analyze this data to allow the movement to make informed decisions and take actions as necessary (usually through the International Board).
- *SG accountability to the International Board:* The SG is accountable to the International Board; the relationship between the SG and the International Board, including reporting

¹⁷ In 'More than the Tip of the Iceberg, Holistic Accountability for Amnesty International, A report on the International Committee on Governance', ORG 30/005/2005, Amnesty International (2005).

¹⁸ The role of the IC is summarised in Annex 2.

lines, is defined through “The Special Relationship between the IEC and the Secretary General”¹⁹.

- *International Board accountability to the IC*: The International Board is elected at the ICM. The International Board formally reports to the IC every other year at the ICM.
- *International Board accountability to the Chairs’ Assembly (CA)*: The International Board informally reports to the CA every year; moreover, other forms of reporting and information are regularly shared with the Chairs Forum²⁰ (CF) (e.g. bulletins; conference calls with Chairs).
- *Membership Appeals Committee (MAC) to the IC*: The MAC is accountable to the IC through the directly-elected members at the ICM every two years.
- *International Nominations Committee (INC) to the IC*: The INC is accountable to the IC through the directly-elected members at the ICM every two years.
- *Finance and Audit Committee (FAC)*: Although the FAC is an advisory subcommittee of the International Board reporting directly to it, it provides accountability to the IC through the directly-elected members.
- *Chairs Forum Steering Committee (CFSC) to the CA*: The CFSC is accountable to the CA through the directly-elected members at the CA every year.

Where are the accountability weaknesses in AI?

There are a number of accountability weaknesses in AI. In some cases, we have not designed or implemented accountability mechanisms as well as we could have, while in others, there are accountability gaps. GovCom has noted several areas that it believes require discussion.

One is to do with **reporting**. As noted above, we have various kinds of reporting in multiple directions. On the one hand, there is a sense that we have too many consultations and multiple reporting processes both at governance and at operational level in AI, resulting in a proliferation of information; while on the other hand, there is a sense that qualitative reporting and transparency eludes us. Our performance in this regard has recently improved through global accounts and dashboard reporting to the International Board, and will continue to improve through the implementation of the Core Standards. However, at the ICM 2013 many s/s expressed a wish for further improvements in reporting. The challenge here is probably not one of *more* reporting, but of *better* reporting that delivers the most useful and clearest information in a timely way to those who need it.

Another accountability weakness relates to **board accountability**. International Board members are elected by the ICM for fixed terms; however, there are no formal mechanisms for holding them accountable between ICMs. The International Board has made important progress in recent years regarding its own functioning and its accountability to the movement, and it will

¹⁹ ORG 70/006/2011.

²⁰ The *Chairs Forum* (CF) is an advisory body with the primary functions of giving governance advice and recommendations, contributing to building the capacity of s/s Chairs and other AI bodies, building relations among s/s and providing an open space for debate and, undertaking other tasks and making decisions delegated to it by the IC. The CF is composed of the Chairs of s/s, as well as representatives of the international membership and it meets once a year at the Chairs’ Assembly (CA).

continue to do so through its internal implementation of the Core Standards²¹ and its ongoing work on board development. However, this is a good opportunity to consider whether further improvements should be made. This is an area where we will need to consider any changes carefully, particularly in light of their potential impacts on the effective functioning of individual International Board members and the Board as a whole, the role of the INC, and our election practices.

Across the organization, there is also an inconsistent record of **implementing ICM decisions**. This manifests itself in a variety of ways, such as: not meeting commitments under our agreed plans; not adequately resourcing the implementation of ICM decisions; or introducing new proposals at inappropriate times, which has the effect of undermining past strategic or financial decisions. This is a good opportunity to consider ways to improve the accountability of the IS and of s/s regarding their commitments to focus on priority work under our strategic plans, especially as we implement the new strategic goals, which will require a more disciplined use of resources in a shorter timeframe.

Related to this are the issues of the **legal personality** of the ICM and the **legal enforceability** of its decisions. While we have established mutual expectations and traditions regarding the implementation of ICM resolutions, ICM decisions are not legally binding, nor do AI entities necessarily have any formal legal accountability to the ICM (there may be exceptions in cases where national AI statutes create this accountability independently). Currently ICM decisions are only indirectly legally binding, via the use of a trademark licence agreement which allows revocation of the right to use AI's name and logo in the case where a s/s is breaching the AI Statute, thus causing reputational risk.²²

There is also a **lack of adequate transparency and accountability for the use of our financial resources** across the organization.²³ Resources form part of the accountability infrastructure in organizations, and fiduciary responsibilities in turn form part of the governance function. The accountability and transparency of all AI's entities for the effective use of the available resources is essential to improved global governance. Two key issues are related on how transparency and accountability affect decision making processes: decision making and reporting on the use of the total global income across all entities; and decision making and transparency regarding the international budget, and reporting systems.

Finally, there are **inequalities between funded and funding sections** when it comes to accountability. Funded sections are dependent on grants, and are expected to be much more rigorous and accountable than the funding sections (for example, all funded sections complete Standard Activity Reports, which some funding sections do not). While some ongoing changes

²¹ The International Board intends to do an initial self-assessment under the relevant Core Standards in time to report to the 2015 ICM.

²² GovCom has already begun discussions with our IS in-house Legal Counsel about what legal reforms are possible to support stronger accountability, however, these discussions are too preliminary and our information as yet too limited to consult on this issue now. We may integrate our analysis of those options into more developed proposals for movement discussion at a later stage.

²³ AI's resource allocation mechanism (RAM) covers the IS and the s/s, with an international budget and related reporting tools, including Common Accounting Framework (COCO) and the grant/loan management systems.

will help (such as Core Standards reporting), we need to go further to eliminate the two-tier accountability system.

3.4 THE STATUTE

ICM 2013 Decision 7 called for a review of AI's Statute. We believe that the bulk of changes to the Statute should arise as needed from the reforms we make in response to the scope of issues raised by this consultation. For example, we may want to strengthen the language in the Statute concerning accountability, depending on the accountability reforms we eventually propose.

There are other parts of the Statute that have not yet been addressed. One of these additional areas is the role and composition of the **Membership Appeals Committee (MAC)**. The Membership Appeals Committee is a statutory body that is elected by, and reports directly to, the IC. Its role is to adjudicate on appeals against decisions made by the International Board related to the sanction of AI entities.

There is a need for an internal appeals mechanism; that is not in question. However, there are a number of issues regarding MAC which are worthy of consideration as part of the governance review:

- MAC does not figure highly in the elections - in fact, the elections for MAC are rarely contested. Nonetheless it is important to ensure that the elected members have the right balance of skills needed to assess complex financial, legal, and organizational conflict issues. Because MAC is dormant unless required, the challenge of mobilising the group to engage with new policy directions and priorities can be complex. MAC can become disconnected from the priorities/policies of the movement - for example the quickly evolving work on Core Standards is highly relevant to MAC - and yet MAC is expected to remain outside this political space.
- MAC currently has five members, who must work together quickly when they are called upon. The complexity of the work is such that a smaller group might be more efficient while still being effective.
- A further issue relates to the remit of MAC. Its mandate relates to sanctions against s/s. However, MAC might have utility in other areas and processes, such as the dismissal of International Board members or international members.

4 QUESTIONS FOR CONSULTATION

Successfully reforming our governance system is something we must do together, drawing on our collective experiences, perspectives, and ideas. These questions are intended to give you an opportunity to comment on our governance system and the analysis of it in this paper, as well as to share suggestions about ways that we can build on our strengths and address our weaknesses. Please be creative and challenging in your comments; no idea is too radical at this stage. Where possible, underpin your proposals with examples of concrete practices or experiences from other organizations or other parts of AI. Keep in mind that we are focused on the international level, and on how we can enhance global governance.

Given the importance of this process, we encourage you to engage with these questions fully and thoughtfully. However, if you are not able to respond to all of the questions below, we welcome your feedback on those questions where you have particularly developed perspectives or ideas. **If you have any additional comments, please add them at the end of the appropriate section.**

Our approach to governance reform

Are we missing any important criteria for governance reform from the list on page 3? Are there any criteria that should be changed or removed? Please specify.

The four areas identified in this document as priority areas for governance reform are: the ICM and Chairs' Assembly; decision-making; accountability; and Statute reform. Are there any other area that should be prioritised? Please specify.

Would you add or change anything significant to our overall assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of AI's current governance system? Please specify.

ICM and Chairs' Assembly

What is required to ensure that our global governance meeting is organized and convened to maximise adherence to the criteria for governance and decision making above?

If we were starting out again from the beginning, what decisions should we make regarding the frequency, the length, the objectives, the size, the format, the content, and the cost of the ICM?

Are we currently striking the right balance between governance/business, learning/sharing, and networking/relationship-building at the ICM? If not, how should the balance shift?

What steps would ensure that delegations have the experience and competencies needed to provide global strategic governance, while ensuring continuity and diversity in governance? Such steps could include (but are not limited to) things like: proposed delegate criteria; accountability; training; and longer delegate term lengths.

Given our expanding global presence and the need to control ICM costs, should we reduce the size of ICM delegations? If so, what changes could we make to the ICM that would make smaller delegation sizes suitable? If we do not reduce delegation sizes, how else might we control ICM costs?

How could the burden of preparing for ICMs be reduced? What support, tools, and information would be most useful?

What changes would you propose for the Chairs' Assembly, given the different role and structure you might be proposing in your comments above for the ICM? What do you think about holding the Chairs' Assembly at the same time as the Directors' Forum?

What reforms to the roles of the PrepCom, or CFSC, would you propose, given your other suggestions for the ICM?

Distribution of power

What are the key issues related to power imbalances in the movement that are undermining our values and the quality of our governance? How can we address these issues?

Decision making

How can the current system for the calculation of voting rights be improved to address the issues related to democracy, accountability, and power?

How can we improve on the resolutions-based decision-making model? Please be specific, and suggest anything ranging from reforms to the current model to replacements for the current model.

How can we improve our capacity for meaningful discussion prior to the ICM? What would be feasible, affordable, and useful?

What reforms would you prioritize in this area?

Accountability

What steps can we take to strengthen the international governance systems in AI, to enhance the accountability of the various actors identified in Annex 2?

How can we address the two-tier accountability system between funding and funded sections?

How can we improve our reporting system? For example, what critical information should it provide, who should report to whom, how and when should this reporting be shared, and how can we use these reports to enhance accountability?

How can we improve transparency and accountability regarding our finances?

Statute reform and issues

Do you have recommendations that can enhance the role and effectiveness of the Membership Appeals Committee?

Given that the International Board will be bringing recommendations for Statute changes to the ICM for decision in 2015, are there any aspects of the Statute which we have not mentioned, and which you feel need to be updated or changed?

Are there gender and diversity dimensions or gaps related to Amnesty's global governance that we should address, and how could we do this?

Are there any issues or proposals related to governance reform not already discussed, that you would like to recommend?

5 PRACTICALITIES OF THE CONSULTATION ON GOVERNANCE REFORM

5.1 SUGGESTIONS FOR S/S ON HOW TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONSULTATION

Identify who is in charge: Identify the person in charge of leading the process of gathering feedback. The Chair (or nominated representative) with the support of the board should be the person ultimately responsible for ensuring that the document submitted to the IS reflects the views of the stakeholders consulted.

Identify which stakeholders you want to consult:

- Board
- Director
- Relevant staff engaged with international governance processes and/or meetings
- Past ICM participants
- Members
- Relevant external stakeholders

How to consult: Depending on the number of people involved in the discussion, different mechanisms can be used. We suggest that you organize meetings or use already planned meetings (e.g. AGMs, board meeting), and also use phone, Skype, email, and other technologies to gather the views of a range of people at minimum cost.

5.2 OVERVIEW OF CONSULTATION TIMETABLE

Launch of the consultation	20 May 2014
Presentation and discussion at the CA-DF	21-22 June 2014
Possible revision of consultation doc following CA-DF discussions	July 2014
Closing of consultation	31 August 2014
Review of the feedback received	September 2014
Collated feedback shared with the movement	October 2014
Resolution development	Oct-Dec 2014
Draft resolution submission	Mid-January 2015
Consultation on draft resolution	Jan-May 2015
Final resolution submission	Jun 2015

5.3 HOW TO SUBMIT RESPONSES

All inputs should be sent to governance.reform@amnesty.org; this email address should also be used for any queries or comments you have about this consultation.

We are keen to make this consultation process as interactive as possible and we are aware that emails might not always be the most effective means of communication. GovCom will offer regional video or teleconferences for s/s that wish to discuss this in further depth with us and with one another. If you are interested in participating, please let us know.

ANNEXES: SUPPORTING AND PARALLEL ANALYSES

ANNEX 1: TEXT OF ICM 2013 DECISION 7 ON GOVERNANCE REFORM

The International Council:

RECOGNISING

- That the implementation of the Global Transition Programme (GTP) and delivery of 'One Amnesty' has changed our global organization model.

- That these significant changes may affect our governance system, and in particular the role of the ICM, in light of its strategy function, its responsibility for oversight of financial systems and holding the International Board (Board), Sections, structures and other forms of presences as appropriate accountable.

- The need to uphold the legitimacy and effectiveness of our democratic decision-making mechanisms, in particular the ICM as our highest decision-making body.

REQUESTS the Board to develop proposals for strengthening our governance system, including the development of an international integrated accountability and accompanying reporting systems towards different stakeholders, building on previously carried out studies, in particular about holistic accountability (ORG 30/005/2005). This international integrated accountability system should include the voting of reports at the International Council Meeting.

INSTRUCTS the Board, to undertake a review as to whether our governance system, model and processes are 'fit for purpose' to support the new ways of working and ensuring maximum human rights impact, building on previously carried out studies and other ongoing work, in particular the study commissioned by the Global Governance Task Force in 2010. Moreover, the Board should examine whether our governance system is in line with the seven principles for democratic governance as adopted in decision 10 of the 2009 ICM. The review, and following proposals, should aim to endorse and strengthen our internal democracy and identity as a membership based organization.

The review should include:

- the system of reporting by the Board, Sections and Structures and other Forms of Presence to the ICM, on the delivery of:
 - the Board's and sections' and structures' work and responsibilities
 - the implementation of operational and governance standards
 - the implementation of ICM resolutions;
- the role, composition, frequency and functioning of the ICM, in its interaction with other international and regional oversight bodies (the Board, Chairs' Assembly), lower-level decision-making processes and in its capacity to hold accountable the different components of the movement;

- consideration of the appropriate delineation of matters and lines of accountability between the governance of the movement, and the management and, in particular, between the Board and the Senior Leadership Team and the Global Management Team;
- consideration of the Statute of Amnesty International with a view to (a) providing a more comprehensible and concise document; (b) updating the Statute with regard to articles or parts which have become obsolete or outdated; (c) reflecting developments arising out of the ongoing work on New Forms of Presence and the work of the GTP; and (d) reflecting ongoing developments arising out of the ICM 2011 Decision 1.

REQUESTS the Board to report on the implementation of this resolution to the Chairs' Assembly in 2014 and present proposals for decision-making to the ICM 2015, including Statute amendments as appropriate.

ARISING FROM RESOLUTIONS 2.01, 2.06, 2.09 AND 2.10

ANNEX 2: BACKGROUND FACTUAL INFORMATION ON AI GOVERNANCE

Amnesty International (AI) is a movement based on worldwide voluntary membership; it consists of self-governing and locally registered *sections and structures* (s/s), international networks, affiliated groups and international members united by a central structure, and by shared core values, vision and mission. "AI's vision is of a world in which every person enjoys all of the human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments. In pursuit of this vision, AI's mission is to undertake research and action focused on preventing and ending grave abuses of these rights"²⁴.

AI's highest governance and decision-making body is the *International Council* (IC) which has responsibility for deciding the global strategy, establishing systems and bodies of governance and delegation for the movement, and holding s/s and other bodies accountable. The IC meets every two years at the *International Council Meeting* (ICM). The IC consists of *International Board* members, and representatives of s/s and of the international membership. Voting rights are weighted to reflect the number or groups of members in any specific country or of the international membership. S/s can propose changes to AI's policies, procedures, vision and mission through a resolutions process; proposals come in the form of resolutions to the ICM. Resolutions are discussed and voted on first at a working party and then at a plenary session; once a resolution has been approved it becomes a decision. The Preparatory Committee is responsible for the efficient preparation of the ICM and it can recommend consolidation of resolutions.

The IC elects the International Board which provides the day-to-day governance to the movement. The International Board consists of the Treasurer and eight regular members who are individual or AI international members. The International Board may co-opt up to two additional members; co-opted members do not have the right to vote. The International Board meets at least twice a year and is accountable to the ICM.

The governance work of the International Board is organized through the following main

²⁴ AI's Statute.

Committees (and may also be supported by ad hoc committees):

- *Finance and Audit Committee* (FAC) – an advisory subcommittee of the International Board, reporting directly to it. The FAC comprises five members: the International Treasurer, two elected or co-opted members of the International Board or an independent expert appointed by the International Board and two members directly elected at the ICM from AI membership. The main purpose of the FAC is to ensure compliance of accounting and financial reporting with relevant legislation; maintain oversight of all significant financial, accounting, internal control and risk management issues; oversee the external auditors; monitor the integrity of the financial statements; and provide accountability to the movement through the directly-elected members.
- *Governance Committee* (GovCom) – an advisory subcommittee of the International Board, reporting directly to it. The GovCom includes two members of the International Board, one external member and four members from the movement. The aim of the GovCom is to provide oversight and direction to the programme of work on governance reform that is being implemented in the context of 2013 ICM Decisions.

There are two additional governance committees in AI. These are:


- *Membership Appeals Committee* (MAC) – a committee with five members directly elected by the IC. Its function is to hear appeals of decisions of the International Board, when the decision relates to matters on which the Statute or a decision of the IC gives a right to appeal (such as the suspension or closure of a s/s).
- *International Nominations Committee* (INC) – a committee with five members directly elected by the IC that may in cooperation with the International Board, co-opt up to two people. The purpose of the INC is to seek out appropriately qualified candidates to the International Board and other internationally elected positions.

The *Chairs Forum* (CF) is an advisory body with the primary functions of giving governance advice and recommendations, contributing to building the capacity of s/s Chairs and other AI bodies, building relations among s/s and providing an open space for debate and, undertaking other tasks and making decisions delegated to it by the IC. The CF is composed of the Chairs of s/s, as well as representatives of the international membership and it meets once a year at the Chairs' Assembly (CA), which elects the *Chairs Forum Steering Committee* (CFSC) composed of current and past chairs elected at the CA, a representative of the International Board, and the Chairperson of the IC.

AI's day-to-day affairs and implementation of IC decisions are conducted by the *International Secretariat* (IS) headed by a *Secretary General* (SG) under the direction of the International Board. The SG appoints a *Senior Leadership Team* (SLT) and staff to run the IS. The *Global Management Team* (GMT), a mixture of representative section Directors and members of the SLT, supports and advises the SG in decision-making at the global level for movement-wide investments and other matters. This team reports to the SG and provides recommendations to him/her for his/her ultimate decision. The IS is legally registered in the UK as Amnesty International Limited, a not-for-profit company limited by guarantee; the IS also has a charitable arm, Amnesty International Charity Limited, which receives limited grant and legacy income. International Board members are also Directors of Amnesty International Limited.

A graphic depicting the Governance system and accountability lines is shown below.

AI'S GLOBAL GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM



Solid arrows: formal accountability lines
Dotted arrows: informal accountability

ANNEX 3(I): SUMMARY OF LESSONS AND UNIMPLEMENTED REFORMS FROM PAST GOVERNANCE REVIEWS

Since 2005, Amnesty International has undertaken a number of independent and internal evaluation and review processes which have helped to identify the strengths and weaknesses in its current governance model. Four key reviews include the Owers, Compass, Caldwell, and Big Difference reports. The lessons learned have been an important catalyst for some governance reforms; however, there are areas where more work needs to be done.

The lessons, observations and recommendations arising from the review processes that were not implemented or only partially implemented are summarized here, and it may be appropriate to implement some of them as part of this governance reform process. The recommendations are grouped according to the general areas which were identified as being in need of strengthening.

Roles and responsibilities

The reports found that knowledge of Amnesty International's governance structure and the roles and responsibilities played by different governance bodies was not as high as expected amongst movement stakeholders. The reports recommend that it is important to develop, communicate and maintain a clear map of roles and responsibilities in the organization by:

- Ensuring there is greater clarity in global governance arrangements. In particular, the roles and relationships between the International Board, International Council Meeting (ICM), the Chairs Forum (CF) and their interaction with the International Secretariat (IS) need to be more transparent.
- Providing governance training at international meetings.
- Clearly defining governance and management responsibilities.

Effectiveness

The reports assessed the effectiveness of Amnesty's governance system (particularly the ICM) in setting and reviewing the organization's strategy and priorities, and made the following recommendations:

- Amnesty International should conduct a review of the best model and process for a) overseeing the strategic direction of the organization; and b) ensuring effective accountability.
- Amnesty International could consider an option through which the outcomes of some governance discussions (e.g. on strategy, campaigns, human rights issues) would be summarized by leaders responsible for taking them forward and recorded in the minutes, without the need for formal resolutions or votes at the ICM.

- Less time should be spent on formal resolutions, and the use of resolutions should be confined to issues where it is important for the ICM to take a decision for the movement.
- The cost of ICMs should be reduced (it was found to be much higher than those of governing bodies in similar global NGO federations) by shortening its duration and reducing the number of attendees.
- A new committee should be formed to coordinate preparations for both ICM and Chairs' Assembly meetings to ensure continuity in governance and help reduce costs. Membership should be based on current PrepCom roles and widened to include representatives of section and structure (s/s) Chairs²⁵.

Participation

The reports made the following recommendations meant to enable s/s to play a more active and effective role in global governance:

- Maximize the use of teleconferences, videoconferences and social networking in global governance to reduce the number of face-to-face meetings each year
- Limit all documents for formal consultation with s/s or for ICM/ Chairs' Assembly meetings to 6 pages, and produce executive summaries in accessible and jargon free language.

Accountability

The Amnesty International's internal procedures, mechanisms and leadership responsibility for accountability were addressed by the reports. Under present arrangements the ICM is the only forum where formal internal accountability takes place. It is not viewed as the best format for holding AI accountable for its actions to the public and internal stakeholders due to the complexity of accountability requirements and detailed exploration needed. The reports recommend that:

- Both the International Board and s/s need to be held accountable to the international movement for delivering on their objectives and ensuring the quality of its governance
- The Chairs Forum could be a possible mechanism for holding the International Board to account across a wide range of areas, including the implementation of strategy, through more detailed and regular reporting by the International Board
- The International Finance Meeting could be a useful forum where international treasurers could receive regular financial reporting from the FAC, and hold each other and the International Board to account

²⁵ The Terms of Reference of the CA, CF and possibly other bodies would need to be concomitantly amended.

ANNEX 3(II): SUMMARY OF EVALUATIONS FROM ICMS 2009, 2011 AND 2013

Evaluation feedback from all three ICMS shows that people's overall experience is a positive one. In particular, participants emphasize the benefits of networking, building relationships, learning about different s/s experiences, and gaining a better understanding of the international context in which AI operates.

However, evaluation responses were divided on the question of how well the ICM fulfils its primary governance roles, which include setting the organization's strategic direction, establishing systems and bodies of governance, evaluating the movement's performance against its agreed strategies and plans, and ensuring internal accountability.

Democracy and decision-making

On the one hand, the role played by the ICM in approving and adopting the organization's strategy through consensus decision-making is regarded as an essential means of strengthening and building international solidarity within the movement. Through the Working Party and resolutions process, AI members are given the opportunity to provide input and opinions, and have a say about issues and decisions of concern to them and deepen their understanding of the complex issues AI is engaged with. Consequently for some respondents, the ICM is an important means of being heard and creating ownership over the movement's strategic direction through joint decision-making. They see it as essential for promoting democracy and strengthening mutual commitment on the decisions that are taken.

Others however believe that the ICM model is in urgent need of reform. For some respondents the aims of the meeting are too broad (e.g. information-giving, capacity building, decision-making etc.) and they report feeling over-stretched by these multiple and simultaneous processes. And while interesting, they question the relevance of some of the agenda sessions and whether the ICM aims to capture too much and should be scaled back to a governance meeting. A common criticism running through the evaluation feedback is the lack of time for meaningful discussion on the decisions reached in the Working Parties and in plenary, and the lack of time for reflecting on and evaluating the consequences of those decisions. Also, some participants believe that decisions are often taken without ensuring the right resources are in place to deliver upon what the ICM has agreed. Calls are made to improve Working Party procedures to ensure a consistent way of working through the resolutions and that the same methodologies and practices are adopted by each Working Party. It is also recommended that attendees are well-prepared and understand what is required of them in advance of the ICM to enable an effective decision-making process.

Voting and elections

The voting process used at the ICM is widely viewed as being transparent, although the need to make use of new technology to effectively manage voting and stakeholder engagement is proposed by some respondents as a best-practice solution. Attendees report that they like meeting candidates for elections in person, though believe that many deserving candidates are discouraged from standing for election because of their lack of fluency in one of the movement's core languages and the fact that interpretation is not provided during roundtable discussions

with delegates. In the 2013 ICM evaluation it was suggested that the International Nominations Committee (INC) should play a greater role and moderating presence in nominating potential candidates.

Accountability

The experience of accountability also generates a mixed response. Overall, it is seen to provide members with a unique opportunity to both challenge and inspire its membership and is regarded as an essential part of the ICM. Many delegates report that it is the only space where they can learn first-hand what the IS and International Board are doing and have personal contact with them. However, feedback also highlights the need to improve mechanisms and processes to strengthen and enforce accountability. For example, it is noted that the only mechanism for holding members of the International Board accountable is through re-election, and those not standing for re-election cannot be held accountable. It is also seen as too large a forum for demonstrating effective mutual accountability between s/s.

Participation

In 2009, 41% of delegates were first time attendees. In 2011, this figure rose to 51% and in 2013 they constituted two thirds of participants. The significance of this data is reflected in the feedback and the need to better prepare delegations for what to expect. In terms of their participation, language issues are widely perceived as a barrier to meaningful engagement and interaction. For example, not all proposed amendments to resolutions are translated and screened in the Working Parties and some participants reported feeling excluded from the decision-making and bargaining which takes place informally and is standard practice at an ICM. The issue of participation is also linked to the influence larger sections are believed to have at an ICM, and it is suggested by some that more participatory approaches rather than legislative debate could help to facilitate the participation of delegates from smaller sections and improve their ability to influence discussions and meeting proceedings.

ICM duration

Since 2009, efforts have been made to reduce the length of the ICM from seven days to five. The shortening of the ICM reveals a difference of opinion in respondent viewpoints. Some believe the ICM could be conducted more efficiently, while others suggest that more time is needed and that shortening the meeting further will negatively impact the quality of discussion and decision-making.

ICM outputs

Attendees speak highly of the networking advantages gained from attending an ICM and find it both inspirational and motivational. However, in terms of fully understanding how to implement the learnings and outputs from an ICM in their day-to-day work and leadership roles the response is mixed.

ANNEX 4: DELEGATE AND VOTING STATISTICS FOR ICMS IN 2009, 2011 AND 2013

VOTING RIGHTS				ICM 2013 (statistics from ORG 50/009/2013)					ICM 2011 (statistics from ORG 50/005/2011)					ICM 2009 (statistics from ORG 50/011/2009)								
Region	Sections	Assessment (GBP)	% of Total Secretariat income budget 2014 (GBP 61,919,810)	Number of Members	% of Global Membership	Number of Groups	Number of Votes	Number of votes as % of total votes	Number of delegates with voting rights	Number of Members	% of Global Membership	Number of Groups	Number of Votes	Number of votes as % of total votes	Number of delegates	Number of Members	% of Global Membership	Number of Groups	Number of Votes	Number of votes as % of total votes	Number of delegates	
AFR	Burkina Faso			182	0%	59	3	2%	4							na						
AFR	Cote d'Ivoire			293	0%	15	2	1%	4	2,253	0%	39	2	1%	4	na		20	2	1%	3	
AFR	Ghana			2,751	0%	165	4	2%	4													
AFR	Mauritius									1,347	0%	8	2	1%	4	1,609	0%	42	2	1%	3	
AFR	Senegal			11,612	1%	51	3	2%	4	2,846	0%	50	3	2%	4	na		43	2	1%	3	
AFR	Sierra Leone			1,344	0%	64	3	2%	4	1,500	0%		2	1%	4	na		60	3	2%	3	
AFR	Togo			1,506	0%		2	1%	3	1,000	0%		2	1%	4	450	0%		2	1%	3	
AFR	Zimbabwe			3,164	0%	64	3	2%	4													
SUB-TOTAL by region				0	0%	20,852	1%	20	10%	27	8,946	1%	11	6%	20	2,059	0%	11	6%	15		
AMR	Argentina			500	0%		2	1%	4	231	0%		1	1%	3	184	0%		1	1%	3	
AMR	Bermuda			250	0%	<10	1	1%	4	120	0%	3	1	1%	3	165	0%		1	1%	3	
AMR	Canada (Eng)	1,946,180	3%	58,000	4%	651	6	3%	4	54,535	3%	503	6	3%	4	61,186	4%	641	6	3%	5	
AMR	Canada (Fr)	132,214	0%	15,000	1%	300	6	3%	4	13,991	1%	270	6	3%	4	11,163	1%	338	6	3%	4	
AMR	Chile			8,971	1%		3	2%	4	18,905	1%		4	2%	4	4,390	0%		3	2%	3	
AMR	Colombia															30	0%		1	1%	3	
AMR	Mexico			2,108	0%	23	2	1%	4	3,200	0%		3	2%	4	2,400	0%		2	1%	3	
AMR	Paraguay			2,627	0%		3	2%	4	1,623	0%		2	1%	4	1,590	0%		2	1%	3	
AMR	Peru			1,300	0%		2	1%	4	426	0%	17	2	1%	4	338	0%	16	2	1%	3	
AMR	Puerto Rico			968	0%	8	2	1%	4	473	0%	8	2	1%	4	178	0%	4	1	1%	3	
AMR	Uruguay			330	0%		2	1%	4	588	0%		2	1%	4	439	0%		2	1%	3	
AMR	USA	8,309,102	13%	221,000	13%	650	6	3%	6	257,000	16%		6	3%	6	267,786	17%		6	3%	8	
AMR	Venezuela			28,765	2%		4	2%	4	15,900	1%		4	2%	4	10,677	1%	25	3	2%	3	
SUB-TOTAL by region				10,387,496	17%	339,819	21%	33	17%	50	366,992	23%	33	18%	48	360,526	22%	30	17%	47		
ASA	Australia	4,125,309	7%	9,720	1%	684	6	3%	6	11,967	1%	563	6	3%	6	58,362	4%	531	6	3%	7	
ASA	Hong Kong	25,319	0%	1,902	0%		2	1%	4	2,483	0%		2	1%	4	3,673	0%		3	2%	3	
ASA	Japan	153,120	0%	6,541	0%		3	2%	4	6,539	0%		3	2%	4	6,234	0%	86	3	2%	3	
ASA	Republic of Korea	156,043	0%	16,240	1%		4	2%	4	12,915	1%		3	2%	4	10,355	1%		3	2%	3	
ASA	Nepal			6,902	0%	71	3	2%	4	6,503	0%	71	3	2%	4	na		74	3	2%	3	
ASA	New Zealand	111,283	0%	2,500	0%	100	4	2%	3	7,000	0%		3	2%	4	6,000	0%		3	2%	3	
ASA	Philippines			2,582	0%		3	2%	4	1,289	0%		2	1%	4							
ASA	Taiwan			151	0%	42	2	1%	4	230	0%	7	1	1%	4	na		10	2	1%	2	
SUB-TOTAL by region				4,571,075	7%	46,538	3%	27	14%	33	48,926	3%	23	13%	34	84,624	5%	23	13%	24		
EUR	Austria	1,210,757	2%	57,776	4%		5	3%	6	61,600	4%		5	3%	6	82,224	5%		6	3%	5	
EUR	Belgium (Flemish)	400,701	1%	na		240	5	3%	4	6,023	0%	240	5	3%	4	4,634	0%	260	6	3%	4	
EUR	Belgium (Francophone)	641,362	1%	22,000	1%	125	5	3%	4	22,761	1%	116	5	3%	4	23,000	1%	150	6	3%	4	
EUR	Czech Republic			4,202	0%	12	3	2%	4	4,308	0%		3	2%	4							
EUR	Denmark	2,774,846	4%	100,038	6%		6	3%	6	98,288	6%		6	3%	6	84,434	5%		6	3%	8	
EUR	Faroe Islands			1,500	0%		2	1%	4	1,800	0%		2	1%	4	1,588	0%		2	1%	3	
EUR	Finland	715,825	1%	23,124	1%		4	2%	4	16,333	1%		4	2%	4	33,121	2%		4	2%	4	
EUR	France	3,923,112	6%	76,254	5%	401	6	3%	6	17,090	1%	402	6	3%	6	28,113	2%	401	6	3%	8	
EUR	Germany	3,915,340	6%	25,961	2%	596	6	3%	6	25,008	2%	600	6	3%	6	90,000	6%		6	3%	8	
EUR	Greece	27,130	0%	4,870	0%		0	0%	4	1,200	0%		2	1%	4	6,179	0%		3	2%	4	
EUR	Iceland	56,051	0%	20,355	1%		4	2%	4	10,981	1%		3	2%	4	10,261	1%		3	2%	3	
EUR	Ireland	389,482	1%	16,472	1%	112	4	2%	4	9,641	1%	114	4	2%	3	12,043	1%	101	4	2%	3	
EUR	Italy	1,259,437	2%	64,212	4%		5	3%	5	71,056	5%		5	3%	5	85,525	5%		6	3%	6	
EUR	Luxembourg	9,196	0%	743	0%		2	1%	2	879	0%		2	1%	3	752	0%		2	1%	3	
EUR	Netherlands	6,957,045	11%	269,084	16%		6	3%	6	287,427	18%		6	3%	6	301,643	19%		6	3%	7	
EUR	Norway	1,926,688	3%	114,000	7%		6	3%	6	100,632	6%		6	3%	6	52,500	3%		5	3%	7	
EUR	Poland			2,588	0%		3	2%	4	2,743	0%		3	2%	4	2,730	0%		3	2%	3	
EUR	Portugal	88,729	0%	11,711	1%		3	2%	4	11,972	1%		3	2%	4	11,710	1%		3	2%	3	
EUR	Slovenia	22,711	0%	3,900	0%		3	2%	4	4,800	0%		3	2%	4	4,533	0%		3	2%	3	
EUR	Spain	1,755,765	3%	66,977	4%		5	3%	5	60,000	4%		5	3%	6	55,000	3%		5	3%	5	
EUR	Sweden	2,129,012	3%	100,243	6%		6	3%	6	86,380	6%		6	3%	6	74,628	5%	188	5	3%	7	
EUR	Switzerland	3,729,103	6%	45,000	3%	74	5	3%	6	49,000	3%		5	3%	6	43,009	3%		5	3%	8	
EUR	UK	8,917,550	14%	138,560	8%		6	3%	6	156,754	10%	1020	6	3%	6	159,805	10%	1020	6	3%	8	
SUB-TOTAL by region				40,849,844	66%	1,169,570	71%	95	48%	110	1,106,676	71%	96	52%	111	1,167,432	72%	95	54%	114		
MENA	Algeria			2,795	0%	11	3	2%	4	600	0%	10	2	1%	4	107	0%		1	1%	3	
MENA	Israel			430	0%		2	1%	4	350	0%		2	1%	4	600	0%		2	1%	3	
MENA	Morocco			3,360	0%		3	2%	4	2,554	0%		3	2%	4	1,025	0%		2	1%	3	
MENA	Tunisia			1,667	0%		2	1%	4	1,097	0%		2	1%	4	837	0%		2	1%	3	
SUB-TOTAL by region				0	0%	8,252	1%	10	5%	16	4,601	0%	9	5%	16	2,569	0%	7	4%	12		
SUB-TOTAL				55,808,414		1,585,031		185		156	1,536,141		172		161	1,617,210		166				
Recognized Structures																						
AFR	Burkina Faso									1,223	0%		1	1%	4	na			1	1%	3	
AFR	Mali			1,480	0%		1	1%	3	1,071	0%		1	1%	4	na			1	1%	3	
SUB-TOTAL by region				1,480	0%		1	1%	3	2,294	0%		2	1%	8				2	1%	6	
ASA	Malaysia			219	0%		1	1%	4	1,658	0%		1	1%	4	na			1	1%	3	
ASA	Mongolia			2,912	0%		1	1%	4	1,321	0%		1	1%	4	na			1			