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Explanatory memorandum on the mandate review resolution

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24th INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL 1999

Explanatory memorandum on the mandate review resolution

1. Introduction

This memorandum gives the text of the IEC's revised resolution on the mandate review (which
replaces resolution R.I.D), together with the draft resolution drafted for the IEC by
the SCM, some background information, and a commentary on the SCM's draft. Although the
IEC decided to submit a shorter and simpler resolution to the ICM than the one proposed
by the SCM, the SCM's draft is being circulated to enable Sections to introduce any
elements they wish into the IEC resolution. For further background information on the
process leading the SCM to this draft resolution and for information about the progress
of the SCM's work on the mandate review to date, please consult the "Report of the Standing
Committee on the Mandate to the 1999 ICM" (ORG xx/xx/99).


The purpose of presenting a resolution to the ICM at this stage is to give the ICM an
opportunity to indicate the general direction and framework within which it would like
the SCM's work on the mandate review to proceed over the next two years, without deciding
on any specific changes at this stage. The IEC regards the resolution as an opportunity
for the ICM to give a non-binding "straw poll" of its views. It will be non-binding in
the sense that it will shape the next stage of the SCM's work, but the 2001 ICM will be
free to accept or reject any proposals that emerge from this work.


2. The IEC resolution on the mandate review

This resolution replaces resolution xx; its relationship to the SCM's draft resolution
is given in section 6 of this memorandum below.


The International Council,

Considering 1997 ICM Decision 3 which requested the IEC to establish a process to engage
in a general review of the mandate in order to evaluate its coherence and relevance and
to submit an interim report to the 1999 ICM if possible;


Considering the Standing Committee on Mandate's "Consultation on Broad directions" (POL
21/04/98) and the comments and reactions received to this paper from within the movement;


Considering that in order for the review to be completed by the 2001 ICM, key decisions
on its overall direction need to be taken now;


Considering that the term "mandate" in AI's vocabulary may cause confusion because it
can have at least three different meanings:
- a general statement of our aspirations or mission (as contained in the Integrated
Strategic Plan);
- an indication of the boundaries to AI's permissible work;
- an indication of what AI actually works on (as determined by the Integrated Strategic
Plan);
- an indication of the policy positions AI adopts on specific issues;



DECIDES to henceforth employ the term "mandate" in the sense of "boundaries to AI's
permissible work";


DECIDES to adopt the following broad directions for the second phase of the mandate
review:


1. The boundaries of AI's permissible work should continue to be expanded
incrementally ("logical next step" approach);


2. What AI actually works on within these boundaries should be determined by the
Integrated Strategic Plan;


3. Ways should be found for AI to address more effectively violations of economic,
social and cultural rights;


4. In order to explore possible new areas of work greater use should be made of pilot
projects;


5. The AI Statute should contain merely a broad statement of AI's mission; the
boundaries to AI's permissible work should continuously be updated in a separate
document and a database.


3. The terminology of mandate debates

The term "mandate" is interpreted in many different ways within AI. Sometimes it refers
to Article 1 of the Statute, sometimes to the scope of AI's actual work, sometimes to
AI's policy positions, and sometimes to the scope of AI's permissible work (as defined
in ICM resolutions and elsewhere). Historically, people have tried to get the mandate
expanded on the assumption that any issue newly added to the mandate will be worked on
by AI at a relatively high level of intensity. While this may have been a reasonable
assumption in the past, it is clearly not a reasonable assumption today. To clarify where
AI stands, the SCM proposes that we revise our terminology as follows:


* AI's mission should be a general statement of our aspirations (eg, as stated in
the introduction to the Integrated Strategic Plan).
* Within this broad mission, we should set boundaries to AI's permissible work.
* Within these boundaries, the Integrated Strategic Plan will determine what AI
actually works on.
* Within these boundaries also, policy positions will clarify our work on specific
issues (eg, on sanctions; on advocacy of hatred).


Although the relationship between mission and boundaries is strictly hierarchical (in
that the boundaries fall within the mission), we recognise that there will be some
interaction between AI's actual work and the formulation of policy positions: it makes
little sense to formulate policy positions on issues which AI does not intend to work
on, but on the other hand the work itself may shape the policy positions as the movement
learns from experience. For example, guidelines are sometimes drawn up when AI starts
to undertake a new area of work (such as approaches to opposition groups or to companies),
but these guidelines are often adjusted as this work develops.




The SCM hopes that this new terminology will help to distinguish debates about philosophy
and fundamental principles from debates about resources, priorities and implementation.
In the past, these have often been muddled together in discussions about the "mandate"
of AI. The new terminology should also make it clear that a decision to expand the
boundaries of AI's permissible work does not automatically mean that substantial work
will start immediately in the new area; in many cases, it may be more realistic to expect
a gradual build up of work in new areas.


The SCM is not making any recommendations on the AI mission at this stage because the
IEC believes that it would be most straightforward to retain the present mission until
the completion of the mandate review in 2001.


Note that in the IEC resolution, and arising from this analysis of AI's terminology, the
term "mandate" is defined to mean "the boundaries of AI's permissible work."


4. Fundamental principles of AI's mandate

In Question 1 of the "Consultation on broad directions" (POL 21/04/98), the SCM outlined
eleven "fundamental principles" of AI, and asked which were most fundamental and which
(if any) could be dropped. Sections' responses to this question indicated that the term
"fundamental principles" is itself controversial. Some of the principles are seen as
working rules; others as criteria for deciding the level of action AI should undertake;
and others as strategic considerations.


Furthermore, some of the principles are interpreted differently by different respondents.
For instance, the term "global coverage" is sometimes interpreted as meaning that AI will
have a minimum level of coverage of some sort on every country, and sometimes as meaning
that AI will have a minimum level of coverage on every country on a particular human rights
violation (eg, torture).


Two conclusions can be drawn from this. Firstly, we need to be clearer about our vocabulary,
raising awareness of the different meanings that phrases such as "global coverage" and
"international solidarity" have for different AI members. For example, "international
solidarity" is often mentioned as a fundamental principle of AI, but it is apparent that
it has two quite distinct meanings within the movement: some take it to mean that as
individuals we work on behalf of individuals in other countries; others take it to mean
that we show a commitment to the same values (freedom of expression; respect for physical
integrity) across cultures and national borders.


Secondly, we also need to recognise that while some values are uncontroversial and
unproblematic (eg, impartiality, because AI will always strive to be impartial), others
are less straightforward. For instance, there are differences of opinion about the extent
to which AI actually embraces multiculturalism, indivisibility, and even independence.
The SCM recommends that members bear these issues in mind when discussing the ICM
resolution.


5. Broad directions for the mandate review

The SCM decided to ask the ICM to clarify the directions it wishes the mandate review
to take in regard to questions 2,3,4, 8 and 10 of the consultation paper (ie, Should AI
work on all human rights? If AI works on some human rights, which ones should they be?
Should AI work on different rights in different ways? How should decisions relating to
AI's mandate be made? How is the mandate best presented?). We do not think that the SCM
can usefully focus its work over the next two years without some indication from the ICM
on these questions. The SCM's further work on these questions, and its work on the other
questions in the consultation paper (relating to economic, social and cultural rights;
non-state actors; abuses in armed conflicts; and mandate development criteria) will be
guided by the broad directions selected by the ICM from the option lists presented in
the resolution.


6. The SCM's draft resolution and the IEC's resolution

The IEC decided at its meeting in March 1999 to submit the resolution printed above to
the ICM. The relationship between the questions posed by the SCM in its draft resolution
(which is printed at the end of this paper) and the proposals put by the IEC is as follows:


SCM question IEC proposal
A SCM Option 3.1 (in paragraph 1)
B Not addressed directly; option 6 is implied.
C Option 5 from question A (in paragraph 2)
D No specific option: further study recommended (in paragraph 3)
E SCM Option 1 (in paragraph 4)
F SCM Options 2 and 3 (in paragraph 5)


With regard to the changes in terminology proposed by the SCM, the IEC is proposing that
the term "mandate" should be used to mean "the boundaries of AI's permissible work."


7. Commentary on the SCM's draft ICM resolution.

The preamble to the resolution asks the ICM to support the proposed new terminology for
the discussion of AI's mandate. As noted above, we strongly believe that much confusion
has been caused in the past by a failure to distinguish between discussion of the
boundaries of AI's work, and discussion of actual work plans within these boundaries
(which should be settled through the ISP and other planning mechanisms).


The ICM resolution contains many options. This stems from a deliberate decision by the
SCM to include all options that have attracted some support during the consultation
process. In particular, we have added a "status quo" option in several places as one
criticism of the previous ten consultation questions from Sections was that they all
offered changes and most did not enable people to choose the status quo.


Question A: What should be the boundaries of Amnesty International's permissible work?

This question was not asked in exactly these terms in the original consultation paper.
However, because a majority of responses to the consultation indicated that they would
like the scope of AI's work to expand incrementally, and because opinions varied about
the direction of such expansion, the SCM believes that it would be useful for the ICM
to indicate its broad views on this question.


Although the question is about the boundaries of AI's permissible work, answers to it
could impact on practical matters such as AI's commitment to global coverage,
international solidarity, and the current system of decisionmaking. To the extent that
the boundaries are drawn widely, there may be more pressure in planning processes to make
"hard choices" within these boundaries; questions may arise about the balance of AI's
work on different issues in different countries at different times, and so on. Should
an option for wide boundaries be chosen, the movement might feel that it should develop
some broad principles guiding decisionmaking on such "hard choices." This matter is dealt
with further in question E below.


Question B: What should the boundaries primarily be drawn around?

At present, AI draws the boundaries of its permissible work in a way which can only be
understood by looking at the history of the movement. This question offers options to
retain this position or to move towards one that is more clearly based on a single
principle.


When the last mandate review was undertaken, the 1989 ICM gave the Mandate Review Committee
the clear message that "AI concentrates on two sets of rights, namely freedom of
conscience/expression, and physical and psychological integrity; and it works against
the gravest violations of such rights." In answering this question, you may wish to
consider whether AI should continue to be characterised as concentrating on a small number
of rights, or whether it should be characterised as a broader human rights movement
(although perhaps one which only focuses its work on a limited number of rights at any
one time).


At present, the boundaries of AI's oppositional work are drawn differently to the
boundaries of AI's promotional work. You may therefore wish to link your answer to this
question to your answer to question D below.


You may also wish to consider these options in the light of the criteria for mandate
development agreed at the 1995 ICM, and in particular the tension between relevance and
coherence that was identified by the 1997 ICM in calling for the mandate review.


In their responses to the consultation paper, some Sections in effect answered question
B by suggesting formulae such as "AI opposes grave violations in the domain of civil and
political rights" or "AI should oppose violations of all the rights enshrined in the UDHR;
this does not mean we will work on all human rights, it means that we may do so" or "AI
should oppose violations of fundamental standards of humanity." Further such suggestions
from all parts of AI are very welcome as input to the second stage of the mandate review.


Question C: How should AI's actual work relate to the permissible boundaries?

Until quite recently, mandate debate has assumed that AI will undertake a significant
amount of work on all issues within the permissible boundaries of its work. However,
experience shows that this assumption is false. For instance, AI has done relatively
little work on new mandate areas such as house-destruction; working on behalf of those
suffering human rights violations as a result of AIDS/HIV; and most areas that are
theoretically now permissible as promotional work. This question therefore asks about
the relationship between AI's actual work and the permissible boundaries of the work.


Option 1 (which is equivalent to option 5 in Question A) gives the closest match between
boundaries and actual work, whereas option 3 gives the widest variation. If the boundaries
are wider than the scope of the actual work, it is likely that the boundaries will remain
relatively fixed while the work will vary within them. If the boundaries closely match
the actual work, then there may be more pressure to change the boundaries in response
to the changing wishes of the membership. This question, therefore, addresses two issues:
firstly, how much flexibility would you like to shift the emphasis of AI's work within
its permissible boundaries? Secondly, would you like the boundaries to remain fixed in
the longer term while the distribution of AI's work alters within them?


Option 1 is likely to lead to changes in AI's actual work being mainly decided by changes
to the boundaries (the old-style "mandate debate"), especially if the boundaries of AI's
permissible work are narrowed down. By contrast, option 3 is likely to lead to changes
in AI's actual work being mainly decided by planning processes such as the ISP.


Question D: Methods of work

There has been widespread concern within AI about the two-tier distinction between
oppositional and promotional work. This concern covers both the vocabulary we use and
the substantive question of the differences between these two types or work. Option (1)
would entirely remove the two-tier distinction whereas option (3) would retain the
distinction (either in the present form, as defined by 1997 ICM Decision 20, or in a
modified form). In support of option (1), it is sometimes said that the distinction is
confusing and poorly understood (both within and outside AI); that promotional activities
are now firmly integrated into the core of AI's activities instead of being at the
periphery; and that we often mix the two types of work in specific campaigns. In defence
of the distinction, it is sometimes argued that the distinction helps to preserve AI's
core identity (of opposing certain human rights violations); that it helps in managing
our priorities and workloads; and that there is a clear and straightforward distinction

between opposing specific abuses and campaigning in a more general way for human rights
to be respected and upheld.


Option (2) has been included to allow members to choose any option on the boundaries of
AI's permissible work in Questions A and B, but then to allow educational and treaty
ratification work on issues outside these bounds.


There is a strong interaction between the options in Question A and those in this question.
For instance, combining A4 with D1 would allow AI to use any appropriate technique to
combat any violation of the rights in the UDHR; this would represent a large extension
of the permissible boundaries of AI's work. On the other hand, combining A2 with D3
represents a position similar to the status quo; and combining A2 with D2 would reduce
the scope of AI's work outside its present oppositional mandate.


Question E: How should decisions relating to the boundaries of AI's permissible work be
made?


The options offered here may need to be revised in the light of the Decisionmaking and
Accountability Working Group (DAWG) recommendations to the ICM. However, assuming that
we have an ICM, an IEC and an SCM, these options indicate ways in which the "standard
model" of mandate changes being made by the ICM could be supplemented.


The SCM assumes that major decisions about the scope of AI's permissible work and about
its actual work will continue to be taken by ICMs, and is here proposing some ways in
which this core of decisions can be supplemented, not replaced. Furthermore, the SCM
believes that the movement also needs to give more consideration to questions about how
decisions on the actual work of AI are made, and about what sort of principles should
guide these decisions (see comments on Question A above).


Option (1) is based on the assumption that the movement finds the pilot projects in regard
to Non-State Actors a positive experience in decisionmaking. Option (2) is included to
address concerns that AI is too slow to respond to unforeseen events and therefore misses
opportunities to make positive contributions to human rights protection. This concern
can either be addressed by option (2) here, or by drawing wide boundaries for AI's
permissible work in Question A, and then allowing for flexible re-direction of work within
these boundaries.


Options (3) and (4) address the concern that perhaps the ICM should focus on broad
questions, leaving matters of detail to be resolved elsewhere. These options are in effect
recommendations about "normal practice". However, it is of course understood that in any
case Sections have an absolute right to bring any matter to the ICM for decisionmaking.


In support of options 2,3 and 4, it is sometimes argued that ICMs are not well-placed
to make decisions of matters of technical detail, and occur too infrequently to allow
AI to take advantage of some campaigning opportunities. Set against this, are the
arguments that matters of detail can be matters of principle, and that only the ICM is
fully representative of the AI movement. In relation to all three of these options, you
may wish to consider the precedent set by 1997 ICM Decision 10 which delegated authority
to the IEC to decide which weapons of warfare (other than anti-personnel mines) AI should
oppose as indiscriminate.


Question F: Where are the boundaries of AI's permissible work best stated?

The aim here is to replace the confusing situation we have at present in which Article
1 of the Statute is titled "Object and Mandate" yet only includes part of the boundaries
of AI's permissible work. The SCM strongly believes that it is not possible to provide
a complete description of all aspects of the boundaries of AI's work (because it would
have to include an impossible amount of detail, ranging from definitions of fair
procedures for dealing with refugees to guidelines on the assessment of what constitutes
a disproportionate attack in an armed conflict).


However, it is possible to produce a brief summary of the mandate. It is also possible
to draw up a more detailed specification which could be called "The mandate of AI" (of
given a new title) and would give sufficient detail to satisfy most routine enquiries
about where AI draws the boundaries of its activities. On a day to day basis, most details
of AI's actual practice of drawing up guidelines will shortly be contained within the
IS mandate database. For all practical purposes, this is the nearest thing we have to
a complete statement of the boundaries of our permissible work (although it too is
incomplete in the sense that it refers to other documents such as the Geneva Conventions).

If option 1 is supported, the AI Statute will contain both the movement's mission and
a brief summary of the boundaries of its permissible work. If option 2 is supported, the
Statute will only contain the mission, and a summary of the boundaries of AI's permissible
work will be produced as a separate document (rather like the documents in the 1992 AI

Policy Manual). You can select option 1 or option 2, or both. If both were supported by
the ICM, the separate document would presumably give rather more detail than the summary
to be included in the Statute.


Because there is much confusion at present about what actually constitutes the AI mandate,
option 3 has been included as an option to clarify matters.


The International Council,

considering the Standing Committee on the Mandate's "Consultation on broad directions"
(POL 21/04/98) and its interim report on the mandate review, based on consultation
throughout the movement;


bearing in mind that, although this review is due to be completed by the 2001 ICM, key
decisions on the overall directions of the mandate review need to be taken at the 1999
ICM which will adopt the next four-year strategic plan;


RECOGNISING the value of adopting the following terminology for future discussion of
AI's mandate:


* AI's mission should be a general statement of our aspirations (eg, as stated in
the introduction to the Integrated Strategic Plan).
Within this broad mission, we should set boundaries to AI's permissible work.
* Within these boundaries, the Integrated Strategic Plan will determine what AI
actually works on.
* Within these boundaries also, policy positions will clarify our work on specific
issues (eg, on sanctions; on advocacy of hatred).


DECIDES to adopt the following broad directions for the second phase of the mandate
review.


A. What should be the boundaries of Amnesty International's permissible work?
(Select one option)


At the end of the mandate review process, the boundaries of Amnesty International's work
shall be defined:


(1) by narrowing the boundaries of the status quo.

(2) in a manner equivalent to the status quo (in which AI opposes some human rights
violations and carries out promotional work on other human rights issues).


(3.1) by expanding incrementally from the status quo.

(3.2) by dropping some areas from the status quo to make room for new ones. (Unlike the
option above this would keep the number of areas AI covers approximately the same
as at present rather than increasing it.)


(4) by addressing violations of all of the human rights grounded in the principles
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (and other international instruments).
(Unlike option (2), this does not assume that the present distinction between
oppositional and promotional work will be retained.)


(5) by the scope of work defined in the Integrated Strategic Plan.

B. What should the boundaries primarily be drawn around?
(Select one option)



(1) one or more categories of human rights, eg:
(a) grave violations of some or all civil and political rights
(b) As (a) plus grave violations of some or all economic and social rights
(c) As (a) plus violations of economic and social rights that lead to grave
violations of political and civil rights


(2) one or more particular sets of rights, eg:
(a) grave violations of freedom of expression
(b) grave violations of physical integrity
(c) grave violations of the right to freedom from discrimination
(d) certain killings


(3) one or more categories of perpetrators (eg, states, armed opposition groups).

(4) one or more categories of victims (eg, women, children, prisoners)

(5) violations in certain contexts (eg, armed conflicts)

(6) something equivalent to the status quo (which is based on a combination of the
above categories).


C. How should AI's actual work relate to the permissible boundaries?
(Select one option)


(1) There should be no significant difference between the boundaries of AI's
permissible work and its actual work.


(2) The boundaries should be somewhat wider than the actual work, allowing for some
areas to be taken up and others dropped from time to time within the boundaries.


(3) The boundaries should be much wider than the actual work, allowing for significant
changes of emphasis within the existing boundaries.


D. Methods of work
(This question addresses the current two-tier mandate which distinguishes
between oppositional and promotional work. Select one option.)


(1) Abolish the two-tier distinction and use the most appropriate technique in each
case.


(2) Abolish the two-tier distinction and use the most appropriate technique in each
case, while still permitting Human Rights Education and treaty ratification in
relation to all of the rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.


(3) Keep the two-tier distinction. This distinction could be based on Decision 20 of
the 1997 ICM or on other criteria; the language used to describe the distinction
could be revised.


E. How should decisions relating to the boundaries of AI's permissible work be
made?
(Choose none, one or more of these options)


The ICM's decisionmaking should be supplemented by:

(1) By making greater use of pilot projects.

(2) By delegating authority to the IEC to respond to topical issues between ICMs.

(3) By the ICM delegating authority to the IEC to settle matters of detail.

(4) By the ICM delegating authority to the IEC, IS, or SCM to draw up guidelines.

F. Where are the boundaries of AI's permissible work best stated?
(Select one or more of these options. They all assume that AI's mission will
be written into the Statute)


(1) A summary of the boundaries of AI's permissible work should be included in the
Statute. (If this option is not selected, the Statute will only include the mission.)


(2) A separate document, "The mandate of Amnesty International" should be drawn up.

(3) The International Secretariat's mandate database should be treated as the
embodiment of AI's mandate.


DECIDES that the IEC should be guided by these broad directions in carrying out the next phase of the mandate review, and in particular that these directions should guide further work on the issues raised by the questions in the consultation on broad directions (POL 21/04/98).






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Skapat av : Anette HolmquistIndex: ORG 50/006/1999Kategori: Organisation - Årsmöten - Inför
Ändrat: År: 1999Status: Medlem
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