



29TH INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING

CIRCULAR 9

IMPLEMENTING ONE AMNESTY

IEC PROPOSALS ON GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL MEMBERS ONLY

AI Index: ORG 50/002/2009

To: Sections & structures

From: IEC

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SUMMARY

This paper is one of six major strategic papers that the IEC will be circulating in advance of the 2009 International Council Meeting (ICM). The first five papers are each linked to an ICM resolution, and they fit together to provide an integrated package of proposals for the creation of "One Amnesty" – readers are strongly encouraged to look at the links between them. The six papers will be:

- Implementing "One Amnesty" – an integrated approach
- The draft Integrated Strategic Plan (POL 50/001/2009)
- Implementing "One Amnesty" – IEC proposals on governance and democracy (ORG 50/002/2009)
- Implementing "One Amnesty" – IEC proposals on "Assessment to Distribution" (ORG 50/001/2009)
- Implementing "One Amnesty" – IEC proposals on priority-setting and planning
- Implementing "One Amnesty" – Revised IEC proposals following the CF/DF/IFM

This paper is largely based on the work of the International Committee on Strengthening Democracy (ICSD), whose final report is being issued simultaneously.

DISTRIBUTION

This is an internal circular which is being sent to all sections and structures.

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

Please circulate this document to all people in your section/structure who are involved in ICM preparations and those interested in governance issues. Please send your comments to Luna Atkins (latkins@amnesty.org) by Friday 13th April 2009.

Introduction

This paper is one of six major strategic papers that the IEC will be circulating in advance of the 2009 International Council Meeting (ICM). The first five papers are each linked to an ICM resolution, and they fit together to provide an integrated package of proposals for the creation of “One Amnesty” – readers are strongly encouraged to look at the links between them. The six papers will be:

- Implementing “One Amnesty” – an integrated approach
- The draft Integrated Strategic Plan¹
- Implementing “One Amnesty” – IEC proposals on governance and democracy
- Implementing “One Amnesty” – IEC proposals on “Assessment to Distribution”²
- Implementing “One Amnesty” – IEC proposals on priority-setting and planning
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This paper is largely based on the work of the International Committee on Strengthening Democracy (ICSD), whose final report is being issued simultaneously.³

Background

The 2007 ICM called for a review of “Amnesty International’s internal decision-making and governance structures in order to strengthen its positive human rights impact.”⁴ The IEC believes that the proposals in this paper and the associated ICM resolution will both strengthen AI’s democracy and help to improve AI’s human rights impact.

Fundamentally, the IEC sees these proposals as an important part of the “One Amnesty” agenda. We cannot become “One Amnesty” unless there is a stronger “global mind-set” across the movement, with everyone focussing their thoughts on what is best for AI as a whole, and what the implications of decisions are for AI as a whole. This means changing attitudes so that we are more influenced than at present by the views of those for and with whom we work, and are more focussed on how all parts of AI can work together better. In other words, we need both stronger external partnerships and stronger internal partnerships.

Proposals for governance and democracy also cannot be considered in isolation from the development of the Integrated Strategic Plan (ISP), changes in AI’s financial architecture, or the evolution of joint operations between different AI entities. For this reason, we urge readers to consider this paper alongside the papers on the draft ISP, the proposal on “Assessment to Distribution,” and the AI Operations Review.

Seven principles

The IEC’s proposals are based around seven principles developed by the International Committee on Strengthening Democracy (ICSD). These are: impact focus, inclusiveness, diversity and gender, quality participation, transparency, accountability, and effectiveness and efficiency. We believe that these principles provide a firm foundation for the proposals below.

Many attempts to reform AI’s governance and democracy have failed in the past because there was insufficient evidence that the proposed changes would improve matters. The IEC accepts that it is

¹ See *ICM 2009 Circular 8 Draft ISP* POL 50 001 2009

² See *ICM 2009 Circular 7 Assessment to Distribution* (ORG 50 001 2009).

³ See *International Committee for Strengthening Democracy: Final Report to the IEC* (ORG 82 002 2009)

⁴ See 2007 ICM Decision 2.

difficult to provide such evidence in advance of the changes. We are therefore proposing to move forward incrementally, making changes to our culture and important aspects of our institutions before we embed them fully in the AI Statute. We believe that it will be possible to amend and adjust our proposals over the next 2-4 years, and so gradually write them into the Statute, once we are all convinced that they are working well for us.

Statute and culture

Furthermore, much of what we are trying to achieve with these proposals is about changing AI's culture, rather than changing its rulebook. For this reason, we are proposing a very small number of statute amendments at this stage (the smallest number, in fact, that enables these proposals to be implemented). Further changes can be made later on. As we state above, AI cannot become "One Amnesty" unless there is a stronger "global mind-set" across the movement, with everyone focussing their thoughts on what is best for AI as a whole, and what implications decisions have on the impact of AI's work. This change of outlook and culture can only come about by engaging more with the views of people outside AI, especially those for and with whom we work, and by spending more time making all parts of AI work together better, agreeing and then implementing shared priorities.

Proposals for changing AI's institutions

The overall aim of these changes is to create a more global approach to AI governance; to strengthen AI's democracy; to join up the governance of separate AI entities; to enable the views of a wide range of stakeholders to be heard; and to provide oversight of the emerging Global Management Team that is being developed as a result of the AI Operations Review.

- The **ICM** will be the **Global Governance Assembly**.
 - (a) The ICM will include elected members with voting rights representing AI's international membership. Section and structures delegations will be limited to four voting delegates (reduced from six at present) and no more than six delegates altogether (reduced from eight at present).
 - (b) These changes will provide the space for bringing in up to 50 "rightsholders at risk" and external human rights activists. They will not have voting rights and will be selected by the IEC (although they could be elected in future) following proposals from sections and structures.
- The **IEC** will be the **Global Governance Board** of AI.
 - (a) IEC members will be elected for staggered four-year terms with a two-term limit. About half of the IEC will be elected at each ICM. This will reduce IEC turnover and improve continuity.
 - (b) A new International Nominations Committee will identify IEC candidates representing the views of "rightsholders at risk," and representing external human rights activists, and make recommendations in each category. The committee will also work to ensure that the candidates for the IEC have a range of expertise in finance, strategic planning, human rights policy, high-level governance, etc., as well as being able to represent the views of AI members, supporters and activists.
- The **Chairs Forum** will be the **Global Governance Meeting**, agreeing the contributions of all AI entities to AI's global strategic objectives and supporting the IEC in overseeing the performance of AI's emerging global management. It will also be a venue for holding all AI entities accountable for delivery of AI's global strategies, and for consultation, dialogue and cooperation across AI entities.

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- (a) The Chairs Forum will include the participation of three representatives of international members, and of 15 “rightsholders at risk” and external human rights activists. To be consistent with our proposals for the ICM, the former will have voting rights, but the latter will not.
 - (b) The Chairs Forum will become an important venue for consultation, dialogue and mutual accountability. It will develop into an annual forum for achieving “buy in” (agreement) within the ISP priorities for the current operational plan, and for holding each other to account for our contributions to the ISP.
- The new **Global Forum** will be a communication space/system accessible to all key stakeholders, providing the platform for extensive, inclusive and ongoing discussions and consultations.
 - The new **International Nominations Committee** will work to ensure that a broad range of candidates for the IEC and other internationally elected posts are available, combining expertise and the perspectives of internal and external stakeholders. This committee will itself need to be elected by and report to the ICM.

Some differences of opinion between the IEC and the ICSD

Although the IEC agrees with most of the ICSD’s proposals, we do not support three of their recommendations:

- (a) the proposal for an elected global AGM. The IEC believes that it is crucial to have sections/structures represented directly at the ICM, and to retain the two-year ICM cycle.
- (b) the proposal to remove the role of directly elected International Treasurer. The IEC sees no evidence that this direct election has caused problems on the IEC to date.
- (c) the proposal to abolish the Membership Appeals Committee (MAC). The IEC sees no need for this.

Conclusions

The IEC cannot be *certain* that these proposals will improve AI’s democracy and governance. But we are *confident* that they will do so. We are confident because: we strongly believe that they address the unfairness of international members not presently being represented at all in our democracy; because they will also force us all to take more notice of the views of outsiders - especially people for whom and with whom we work - who have highly relevant experience, expertise, and viewpoints; and, because they will help to give all of our decision-making a more “global” emphasis, encouraging us all to put more emphasis on what works for AI as a whole, rather than what is in the interests of the AI entity that we represent.

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Implementing “One Amnesty” – IEC proposals on governance and democracy

1. Background and principles

This proposal has developed from IEC discussion of the work of the International Committee on Strengthening Democracy (ICSD).⁵ The ICSD itself has issued two Consultation Packs⁶ and a Final Report⁷. The first Consultation Pack included a summary of previous AI discussions on democracy and governance going back to the 1980s. The IEC endorses much of what the ICSD recommends, but has also chosen to disagree with some of its proposals (see Section 5 below). In the interests of democracy and transparency, however, we are publishing the full ICSD Final Report as a companion to this paper. Sections and structures can therefore reflect on those ICSD proposals that the IEC has rejected and decide for themselves whether to raise them at the Chairs Forum or the ICM itself.

1.1 Democracy, governance and “One Amnesty.”

Fundamentally, the IEC sees these proposals as an important part of the “One Amnesty” agenda. We cannot become “One Amnesty” unless there is a stronger “global mind-set” across the movement, with everyone focussing their thoughts on what is best for AI as a whole, and what the implications of decisions are for AI as a whole. This means changing attitudes so that we are more influenced than at present by the views of those for and with whom we work, and are more focussed on how all parts of AI can work together better. In other words, we need both stronger external partnerships and stronger internal partnerships. We believe that these proposals will help to create these, and will therefore lead to better decisions resulting in a stronger human rights impact.

Proposals for governance and democracy cannot be considered in isolation from the development of the ISP, changes in AI’s financial architecture, or the evolution of joint operations between different AI entities. For this reason, we urge readers to consider this paper alongside the draft ISP, the proposal on “Assessment to Distribution”, and the summary of the AI Operations Review.⁸

As a general principle, the IEC supports the emphasis that the ICSD has put on the principle of “one member, one vote.” We believe that this principle should be implemented whenever possible, both nationally and internationally. In political science terms, the overall model of democracy that underpins the IEC proposal is “deliberative democracy.”⁹ This is a form of democracy which puts emphasis on giving people the opportunities to learn from each other, and to test their views against those of others, before coming to a conclusion. It has three characteristics which are similar to the themes identified by the ICSD in their first Consultation Pack. It is *fact-regarding* (i.e., evidence based); it is *future-regarding* (i.e., it looks forwards, not backwards to address past grievances); and it is *other-regarding* (i.e., it is concerned with the impact of decisions on others, not just their impact on the decision-makers themselves).

⁵ See *International Committee for Strengthening Democracy – Terms of Reference* (ORG 82/004/2007)

⁶ *Consultation Pack 1* in three parts (ORG 10 002 2008, ORG 10 003 2008, ORG 10 004 2008), and *Consultation Pack 2* in four parts (ORG 10 007 2008, ORG 10 008 2008, ORG 10 009 2008, ORG 10 010 2008)

⁷ See *International Committee for Strengthening Democracy: Final Report to the IEC* (ORG 82 002 2009)

⁸ See *ICM 2009 Circular 7 Assessment to Distribution* (ORG 50 001 2009).

⁹ For a more detailed account see, for example, *Models of Democracy* by David Held, Polity Press, London, 2006.

1.2 Principles and cross cutting issues

The ICSD itself was created by the IEC in response to 2007 ICM Decision 2, which called for a process to ensure

“that Amnesty International will have in place during the 2010-2016 Integrated Strategic Plan decision-making and governance structures that:

- develop clear strategic and operational global strategies;
- align strategic, priorities, competencies and resources;
- strengthen monitoring and evaluation;
- build on a foundation of dynamic and effective democracy
- strengthen voices of right holders.”

The IEC believes that its proposals meet these criteria. The proposals are based around seven principles developed by the ICSD. They also take into account the cross cutting issues that the ICSD has developed in its final report.

PRINCIPLES

1. **Impact Focus:** The final and main objective of AI's governance is ensuring maximum human rights impact.
2. **Inclusiveness:** Internal and external stakeholders must be meaningfully involved in AI's governance.
3. **Diversity and Gender:** AI's governance bodies must be diverse and gender-sensitive.
4. **Quality Participation:** AI's discussion and decision-making culture must be based on competency, mutual trust, transparency, evidence-based information, open minds, a collaborative and constructive approach, and mutual respect.
5. **Transparency:** As a rule, all governance related information must be freely accessible. Confidentiality is the exception.
6. **Accountability:** All of AI's governance structures must be part of an internationally integrated accountability system.
7. **Effectiveness and Efficiency:** AI's governance structures, systems and processes must be as simple, clear and effective as possible in order to make best use of the movement's limited governance resources.

1.3 Current weaknesses

The IEC believes that these principles will attract widespread support. Although they do not completely determine the shape of our democracy and governance, they do highlight areas where AI is currently defective. In particular, for example:

1. **Impact Focus:** Too often, our discussions are based on AI's internal politics, rather than on evidence of what AI should do to strengthen its impact.
2. **Inclusiveness:** We are beginning to involve stakeholders in key committees within AI (e.g., the ISP committee and ICSD), but we have not yet involved them

systematically in the Chairs Forum or the ICM, or provided a means for them to contribute regularly to our consultations.

3. **Diversity and Gender:** both diversity and gender-sensitivity still vary a great deal throughout AI. The 2007 State of the Movement report¹⁰ showed that our leadership is much less diverse and gender-balanced than our membership.
4. **Quality Participation:** The quality of debates in AI varies a lot, and there is no mechanism for ensuring, for example, that the IEC collectively has the right competences to carry out its functions.
5. **Transparency:** It is often difficult to find and gain access to documents and information that are important for AI decision-making.
6. **Accountability:** There is very limited accountability in AI. For example, sections and structures are not formally accountable to anyone for their contributions or lack of contributions to the ISP.
7. **Effectiveness and Efficiency:** It is not effective or efficient to debate the details of policy reviews or narrow, technical topics at the ICM. The ICM needs to focus on broader strategic questions and points of fundamental principle.

1.4 National democracy and governance

The above principles clearly apply at the national as well as at the international level. If they are approved, the IEC would draw up more detailed guidance on the conduct of democracy and governance at the national level, aiming to achieve more consistency, while taking into account the value of national diversity in approaches to democracy. At the same time, national boards would be encouraged to review their systems and practices, checking their consistency with the ICM-adopted principles.

2. Moving forward incrementally

Many attempts to reform AI's governance and democracy have failed in the past because there was insufficient evidence that the proposed changes would improve matters. The IEC accepts that it is difficult to provide such evidence in advance of the changes. We are therefore proposing to move forward incrementally, making changes to our culture and important aspects of our institutions before we embed them fully in the AI Statute. We believe that it will be possible to amend and adjust our proposals over the next 2-4 years, and so gradually write them into the Statute, once we are all convinced that they are working well.

This view is consistent with the view we are taking of changes in AI's international operations and financial architecture. We expect that over the course of the next ISP there will be increasing cooperation and coordination of the work of different AI entities (such as national sections/structures and the IS), and increased agreement on priorities within the ISP that should be binding on all AI entities. Furthermore, we are proposing that the new "Assessment to Distribution" system should evolve steadily over the next five years, with regular checks to evaluate progress and approve the next steps. We cannot be certain what challenges these changes will pose for AI's governance, or of the best ways to respond to them. Of course, we believe that the proposals laid out below are appropriate, but we recognise that strengthening the integration of operational planning across AI may require further changes in our governance system.

¹⁰ See 2007 ICM Circular 33 – *The State of the Movement Report* (ORG 50 025 2007)

3. Statute and culture

Much of what we are trying to achieve with these proposals is about changing AI's culture, rather than changing its rulebook. For this reason, we are proposing a very small number of statute amendments at this stage (the smallest number, in fact, that enables these proposals to be implemented). Further changes can be made later on, as described in Section 4. As we state in our introduction, we cannot become "One Amnesty" unless there is a stronger "global mind-set" across the movement, with everyone focussing their thoughts on what is best for AI as a whole, and what implications decisions have on the impact of AI's work. This change of outlook and culture can only come about by engaging more with the views of people outside AI, especially those for and with whom we work, and by spending more time making all parts of AI work together better, agreeing and then implementing shared priorities.

The IEC is therefore proposing an ICM resolution containing both a statement of principles and a minimal set of Statute amendments needed to implement the principles.

4. The proposals for AI's institutions

It will require a very large number of statute changes and a huge revision of very many AI documents if we change the names of our institutions. We should not do this until we are absolutely sure that we have made changes that are correct and will endure. The IEC does **not** therefore propose to change the names of existing institutions at this stage. Instead, we encourage everyone to consider the functions of the existing institutions as follows, and we propose the changes necessary for these new roles:

The **ICM** will be the **Global Governance Assembly** of AI.
The **IEC** will be the **Global Governance Board** of AI.
The **Chairs Forum** will be the **Global Governance Meeting** of AI.

These roles will also link to those of the emerging **Global Management Team**, as described below. The IEC proposes that we make the changes shown in the table below (at the end of this section) to the three existing institutions, and that we create two new institutions: an International Nominations Committee and a Global Forum.

4.1 Connecting changes to management and governance

These changes to governance are intended to support the changes taking place in AI's international management as a result of the AI Operations Review. This review was undertaken by Accenture Development Partnership (ADP), the non-profit arm of Accenture, an international management consultancy firm. The project was overseen by a steering committee involving eleven Section Directors, chaired by the Secretary General. Its key findings were that there are significant gaps between the goals set by the ISP and AI's actual delivery and outcomes. This is because AI's systems for allocation and distribution of resources limit our ability to make strategic investments where needed. Furthermore, although innovation and pockets of excellence exist within AI, the movement does not take full advantage of them, and different parts of AI too often work in isolation from each other.

The Steering Committee has been developing a new operating model for AI that will overcome these problems. All entities will have a stake, contribute to it, and participate in AI's global operations, according to their competencies, capabilities and resources, and will be held accountable globally.

In this model (which has a big influence on the "Assessment to Distribution" proposals from the IEC), *global* does not mean the IS. It means the level on which the IS and sections/structures operate jointly to bring about human rights impact – it is what we do together. *Global* is best understood as being "One Amnesty" – being part of the overall movement in which all AI entities have a stake. Similarly, *local* does not mean the total of what a section/structure does at the national or local level - it means what we do by ourselves.

This approach to *global* and *local* means we need to "dismantle" some of the borders within AI, and find new ways of coordinating and integrating the work of different AI entities without centralizing all the activities of AI into one mammoth plan or system. The implication is that we need to think about AI more in terms of "functions" (delivery) and less in terms of "geographic location" (territory). To achieve this we will need a Global Management Team (GMT). This will be composed of a selected group of senior managers from the movement. They will be responsible for the development of AI's global operational plan and execution of AI's global operations. This GMT will ultimately need to be accountable to the movement's overall governance structures.

In the proposals below, the IEC envisages that both the IEC and the Chairs Forum will play important roles in providing oversight of the GMT. Further details will be found in the forthcoming IEC circular on priority-setting.

4.2 Changes to the ICM

Key ICM roles: making decisions of highest strategic importance for the movement, including election of the Global Board (IEC), statute amendments, ISP approval, global budgets and audits, holding the Global Board accountable.

We are proposing six changes to the ICM:

- The ICM will include elected members representing AI's international membership (i.e., individuals in countries without AI sections or structures). These elected members will have voting rights at the ICM. This proposal corrects a long-standing deficit in our democracy because at present international members have no opportunity to participate at all. At present, there are just under 3,000 international members, but this number should grow substantially during the next ISP. It is a basic requirement of democracy that they should have representation at the ICM. We are proposing that their numbers should be similar to those for existing sections, namely one voting representative guaranteed, and additional voting representatives according to this tariff for the total international membership of AI:

more than 2,500 international members	1 representative
more than 15,000 international members	2 representatives

This tariff will ensure that there will almost certainly be at least two voting representatives of the international membership present at the ICM. If there were only one member, he/she would probably find it very difficult to contribute effectively to the ICM in isolation.

The IEC will need to seek advice on the design and implementation of a system for organizing the elections, which could be largely internet-based because many of the members join via the internet.

- Section and structures delegations will be limited to four voting delegates (reduced from six at present)¹¹ and no more than six delegates altogether (reduced from eight at present). This will provide the space for bringing in “rightsholders at risk” and external human rights activists (see Appendix II). It will also reduce the influence of a few very large delegations. Please see Appendix IV for information on who would be affected by this change.
- Up to 50 “rightsholders at risk” and external human rights activists will be present at the ICM. They will be selected (although they could be elected in future). Selection would be by the IEC on the advice of the Nominations Committee, and following proposals from sections and structures. Criteria for selection would be developed and would include factors such as gender balance and geographical diversity. They will not have voting powers (although they could in future), but they will have the right to speak and make proposals. The IEC believes that having a “critical mass” of external stakeholders present at the ICM and involved in ICM preparations will enrich the meeting. It will change the dynamic and bring into the room a broader range of experience and wisdom. We believe this because we have seen the effect of IEC co-opted members and external members of IEC-appointed committees. We have picked the number 50 because it would be about 20% of the participants, which is sufficient to make sure that their views are heard in every breakout group, World Café table, and informal discussion.

Logically, there are four options regarding election and voting rights for these 50 additional participants. They could be (a) selected without voting rights; (b) elected with voting rights; (c) selected with voting rights; or (d) elected without voting rights. In the IEC’s view, options (c) and (d) are not meaningful. It would be strange to elect people and not then give them voting rights (option (d)); and it would be unwise to give the IEC or any other body or combination of bodies in AI the right to appoint people with voting rights (option(c)), as this would run counter to our democratic principles and would also produce a conflict of interest. Furthermore, although the IEC is not ruling out these additional participants having voting rights in the future, we do not believe that this is necessary to improve our decisionmaking at this stage. We therefore prefer option (a).

The IEC already has the authority under Article 18 of the AI Statute to invite non-voting individuals to the ICM, so this proposal does not require any statute amendments.

- The ICM will elect an International Nominations Committee (INC). This will be charged with finding candidates for elections to the IEC and other elected international positions. The INC would consist of approximately five people, none of whom were current members or candidates for any other international position, who would be responsible for identifying the competences needed for each position, and possibly reviewing candidates and making recommendations. If this proposal is approved, the IEC would need to develop detailed terms of reference and bring them to either a Chairs Forum or subsequent ICM for approval.

¹¹ AI Belgium and AI Canada both have two branches which each have half of the votes and representation to which their section is entitled. It would be simpler for them if their sections were entitled to four votes (i.e., two per branch) rather than three votes.

- The ICM PrepCom will be given stronger powers over resolutions, enabling them to reject resolutions. At the moment, PrepCom is very reluctant to rule any resolution “out of order” and IECs are also very reluctant to argue that resolutions are inappropriate. As a result, much ICM time can be devoted to discussion of relatively unimportant issues that are not strategic or appropriate. There would, of course, be an appeals procedure direct to the ICM.

4.3 Changes to the IEC

Key Roles: To ensure the overall strategic development of AI globally based on the direction set by the Global Governance Assembly, to appoint the Secretary General and monitor and evaluate his/her performance on an ongoing basis, to approve operational plans and budgets, and to carry out all other fiduciary responsibilities of a board of directors.

We are proposing three changes to the IEC:

- Staggered four-year terms with a two-term limit. There is a problem of rapid IEC membership turnover at present - six new members were elected in 2007; six new members were also elected in 2005. Although this was more turnover than usual, a lot of turnover is common on the IEC. Almost everyone agrees that there is too much turnover, and having a system where not all members are elected simultaneously would considerably reduce the problem. If we keep the two-year gap between ICMs, there are only two ways of solving the problem. One is what we are proposing here: four-year terms with about half the IEC elected at each ICM. The only other option would appear to be holding the elections at the Chairs Forum, which would enable us to stagger the terms of office and elect about half the IEC every year for a two-year term. The risk of four-year terms is that the sheer length of the term might deter people from running for the IEC, or they might get exhausted before the end of their term and become ineffective.
- Possible quotas for different categories of members. The IEC believes that it is desirable for any IEC to have a mixture of members representing AI activists, bringing in specific technical competence, and representing the views of “rightsholders at risk” and external human rights activists. This could be achieved either through the proposed International Nominations Committee (INC) presenting the ICM with a suitable selection of candidates in each category, or by specifying quotas in the Statute. The IEC prefers the first option because it preserves flexibility. We therefore propose that the INC would identify the main categories and make recommendations in each category; this does not require any statute amendments.
- Greater emphasis on competences. Linked to the above, the IEC wants to see more emphasis on the competences of candidates, ensuring, for example, that every IEC has expertise in finance, strategic planning, human rights policy, high-level governance, etc., as well as being able to represent the views of “rightsholders at risk” and AI members, supporters and activists.

4.4 Changes to the Chairs Forum

Key Roles: Accountable to the IEC (Global Governance Board), the Chairs Forum (Global Governance Meeting) has the main task of agreeing the contributions of all AI entities to AI’s global strategic objectives; of supporting the IEC in overseeing the performance of AI’s emerging global management; and of holding all AI entities accountable for delivery of AI’s global strategies. The Chairs Forum is a venue for consultation and dialogue and cooperation across AI entities. It also offers some opportunities for leadership skill development.

The IEC is not proposing any statutory change in the role of the Chairs Forum. But we are proposing these changes:

- As with the ICM, we seek participation by representatives of international members and by “rightsholders at risk” and external human rights activists. We propose three of the former and 15 of the latter (see Appendix III). This will ensure that the size of the Chairs Forum remains reasonable for an annual meeting. To be consistent with our proposals for the ICM, the former will have voting rights, but the latter will not. The IEC will need to develop mechanisms for selecting/electing these participants; ideally they would mostly be people who have attended the previous ICM, thus providing some continuity.
- The Chairs Forum will become an important venue for consultation, dialogue and mutual accountability. It will develop into an annual forum for achieving “buy in” (agreement) for the ISP priorities for the current operational plan, and for holding each other to account for our contributions to the ISP within the statutory framework which places ultimate responsibility on the IEC. One of the biggest weaknesses of our current accountability system is that sections/structures are not directly accountable for their work on the ISP; they do not even have to report it. This needs to change if we are going to create “One Amnesty,” and the Chairs Forum will become a place where governance entities hold each other to account, just as directors are beginning to hold each other to account through international operational planning mechanisms.

If these changes are adopted the IEC will work with the Chairs Forum Steering Committee (CFSC) to review the Chairs Forum Terms of Reference, the CFSC Terms of Reference and the Chairs Forum Standing Orders and propose amendments if and as needed, especially in relation to granting decision-making powers to the Chairs Forum.

A similar proposal was first made in 2001. In a paper which was published just before the ICM¹² but not tabled as a formal resolution, the IEC proposed the following arrangements, but they were not implemented:

“The ICM delegates to all structures the obligation to develop operational plans within the framework of the ISP & requires submission of these to the IEC in a timely manner. The ICM delegates to the IEC the responsibility for ensuring that the IS does likewise.

“This is current practice - at least under the terms of successive ICM decisions - however, once again, few sections, structures etc. comply. To improve the coordination and coherence of our work globally, whilst protecting and enhancing local relevance, we must improve the transparency of our planned and actual performance. In the interests of global solidarity, this cohesion must be strengthened; something which can best be done through well coordinated planning at all levels of the Movement. Sections and coordinating structures have an essential role to play in this process as there can be no effective prioritization (or de-prioritization) across the Movement without the participation, agreement and subsequent observance by all parties. New tools and techniques will be needed at this level to ensure our operational priorities, activities and budgets are well co-ordinated and consistent with the ISP.

“The IEC welcomes the recent efforts of the Directors Forum to explore possibilities for enhancing such operational level cooperation across the Movement and endorses their proposal to establish an operational level structure to facilitate international planning and

¹² See 2001 ICM Circular 42 “International Decision-making in the future - some reflections” (ORG 50/014/2001).

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implementation on the understanding that such a mechanism would be accountable to the Movement's relevant governance structures such as the Chairs Forum and the IEC.

"The ICM holds AI's structures & sections accountable to the ISP but delegates key related responsibilities to the IEC & to the Chairs Forum:

"Each structure within the Movement would be obliged to provide reports to the ICM, within an agreed format, on their achievements, as measured against their operational plans under the ISP. Whilst in principle this is current practice, in reality there is a majority of sections and structures did not provide reports for this year's ICM. The IEC envisages a key role for the Chairs Forum in agreeing a methodology for such reporting and in ensuring the Movement's structures are meeting these obligations."

Furthermore, the proposal put forward here is consistent with 2003 ICM Decision 33 on accountability, which reads in part:

CONFIRMS that the international movement, comprised of the International Executive Committee, Secretary General, and sections and structures of Amnesty International, shall be held accountable for their:

b. implementation of the Integrated Strategic Plan (ISP) and other ICM decisions;

FURTHER CONFIRMS the international movement's obligation to hold its several parts accountable at the international level;

This proposal also fits with the request from 33 current and former section Chairs circulated in December 2008 which requested:

- That any proposed changes to the current governance structures of the movement utilize the unique, democratically representative nature of the Chairs' Forum to strengthen accountability and governance functions within the movement;
- That the Chairs' Forum role be more precisely defined than it has yet been, its decision-making power upheld and that it is fully supported within the context of the new governance and decision-making model;
- That the IEC continue to explore, as it has done in the recent past, ways to collaborate with and benefit from the Chairs' Forum and the combined experience and perspectives represented in this body;

The IEC will lay out its proposals on priority-setting, and the important role of section Chairs in this process, more fully in a separate ICM circular.

4.5 The new Global Forum

ICSD Consultation Pack 2 describes this Global Forum in outline.¹³ The Global Forum would be mainly, but not exclusively, an internet-based global communications space. It would be accessible to all key stakeholders, providing the platform for extensive, inclusive and ongoing discussions and consultations. Everybody, whether formally or informally linked to AI, would be able to use it to raise issues, lobby for positions, initiate discussions, build coalitions etc. AI's decision makers would be able to use the Forum to gather the activists', beneficiaries' and partners' opinions and to explain their own positions.

¹³ See Section 1 of ICSD Consultation Pack 2 Part 1 New Governance Model (ORG 10 008 2008)

The IEC supports the idea of developing such a space, but recognises that it will need to be done gradually, and that considerable investment in information technology will be required to make it effective.

4.6 The new International Nominations Committee

When the Berlin Civil Society Center reviewed AI's governance committees in February 2008,¹⁴ it noted that AI was the only International NGO it looked at which does not have a nominations committee. A few years ago, AI had a Nominations Preparatory Committee (NPC). The committee was established by 1991 ICM Decision 68 and dissolved by 2003 ICM Decision 27. It did not achieve very much because it was under-resourced and too remote from the main governance bodies in AI. A new International Nominations Committee (INC) could overcome these problems and carry out functions such as:

- Producing a list of competences that will be needed by the IEC.
- Producing documentation outlining the work of the IEC, its workload, working methods, time required, support available, etc.
- Producing advertisements for IEC candidates that can be distributed inside and outside AI.
- Preparing and discussing options for "headhunting" IEC members.
- Evaluating IEC candidates against the agreed list of competences.

The INC could also do similar work in relation to the other internationally elected posts (the ICM Chair and Alternate-Chair, the members of the Membership Appeals Committee, the members of the Accountability and Control Committee.)

An INC would itself need to be elected by and report to the ICM. It would need to work with the IEC's own Board Development Committee to analyze the work of the IEC and identify competences required. If this proposal were approved, the IEC would need to develop Terms of Reference and an election system and bring them to the Chairs Forum 2010 or ICM 2011 for approval.

The INC could also play a part in selecting "rightsholders at risk" and external human rights activists to participate in the ICM and Chairs Forum.

¹⁴ See *Review of the Committees serving the IEC of Amnesty International* (ORG 82/004/2008).

Table 1: Proposed institutional changes to AI's democracy and governance

Please note that the IEC has identified options in several places where it believes that further, detailed discussion on the relative advantages and disadvantages of different approaches is desirable.

Institution	Main changes	Impact on AI Statute
ICM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ICM will include elected members representing AI's international membership. These elected members will have voting rights at the ICM. • Section delegations will be limited to four voting members (reduced from six at present) and not more than six members in total (reduced from eight at present) • Up to 50 "rightsholders at risk" and external human rights activists will attend the ICM. They will either be selected or elected, but will not have voting rights. • ICM will elect International Nominations Committee (INC) • PrepCom given stronger powers over resolutions process 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Article 16 will need amendment. • Article 17 will need amendment. • Selection of non-voting participants is consistent with Article 18. • This can be dealt with by an ordinary ICM decision. • This can be dealt with by the ICM Standing Orders.
IEC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Staggered four-year terms with a two-term limit. • Possible quotas for different categories of members. • Greater emphasis on competences. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Articles 30 and 32 will need amendment. • Quota and competences can be managed by the Nominations Committee and do not need statute amendments.
Chairs Forum	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assist IEC in overseeing the global management team • Role in holding all AI entities to account for ISP delivery • Participation by representatives of international membership • Participation by "rightsholders at risk" and external human rights activists. 	No statute changes required: these changes can be made through the terms of reference of the Chairs Forum and its Steering Committee.
Global Forum	This is a new institution, as described in ICSD Consultation Pack.	No statute changes required
International Nominations Committee	This is a new institution.	No statute changes required: this can be created and empowered by an ordinary ICM decision.

5. Some differences of opinion between the IEC and the ICSD

Although the IEC agrees with most of the ICSD's proposals, we do not support the ICSD proposal for an elected global AGM. We have rejected this proposal because we believe it is crucial to have sections/structures represented directly at the ICM, and we will work with national sections and structures to create a high standard of national democracy throughout AI which will ensure that the ICM is truly representative of the AI movement.

The overall "direction of travel" for AI is clearly towards integrated global operations with section/structure operational plans linked to those of the IS, and with section/structure Directors becoming partners in a matrix management system whereby they are accountable to both their national Boards and their fellow Directors on an international management Board and the leader of that Board. The IEC believes that we must create a global governance system that fits well with this emerging reality and successfully ties together the national and international elements of AI.

Such a governance system must provide strong "buy in" for the key actors in AI, and therefore provide the basis for holding them to account. We need to find a governance system that brings the current international board (IEC) and the national Chairs/Boards closer together in providing a unified leadership for AI, providing the basis for the IEC to develop into a global board. In the IEC's view, an ICM without section/structure representation cannot achieve this, and we have therefore rejected the ICSD proposal for a directly elected global AGM.

We also do not support the proposal to remove the role of elected International Treasurer at this stage. In principle, we have no objection to the Treasurer being elected by the IEC from amongst its membership, but we believe that now is not the time to make this change for two reasons. Firstly, there is no evidence that the direct election of the International Treasurer has caused problems on the IEC to date. Secondly, there is no guarantee that persons with suitable experience and sufficient time to take on the special role of the International Treasurer will emerge from the election process for ordinary IEC members. We prefer to see the impact of the proposed INC's work on the financial competence of IEC members before changing the election system for the Treasurer.

Similarly, the IEC believes there is no urgency in implementing the ICSD proposal to abolish the Membership Appeals Committee (MAC), whose role is defined in AI Statute Article 44.

Finally, the IEC has reconsidered its decision announced after the September 2008 IEC retreat meeting to abolish the Accountability and Control Committee created by 2007 ICM Decision 23. We now believe that it would be best to maintain the ACC for at least one more cycle while the IEC develops its own Audit Sub-committee and related operations. However, we still support having ACC representation on the IEC Audit Sub-committee.

6. Some options for consultation

Apart from the obvious question, "Do you agree with the overall proposals outlined in this paper?" the IEC is also interested in hearing your views about those proposals on which we have presented options. These are:

- (a) Should "rightsholders at risk" and external human rights activists participating at the ICM and CF be elected or appointed?

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Who should do the electing/appointment, and what criteria should be used to guide the process?

- (b) Should elections to the IEC take place at the ICM with four-year terms or remain the same as at present?
- (c) Should there be a directly elected international treasurer?
- (d) Should there be quotas for different categories of IEC member?
If so, should these be written into the AI statute or defined by the Nominations Committee and/or ordinary ICM resolutions?

The IEC would like your views on these points, and on this entire proposal by **Friday 13th April 2009**, i.e., two weeks after the Chairs and Directors Forums. This will give us sufficient time to finalise them and the associated ICM resolutions before the ICM. Please send your comments to Luna Atkins, IEC Coordinator (latkins@amnesty.org)

7. Conclusions

The IEC cannot be *certain* that these proposals will improve AI's democracy and governance. But we are *confident* that they will do so. We are confident because: we strongly believe that they address the unfairness of international members not presently being represented at all in our democracy; because they will also force us all to take more notice of the views of outsiders - especially people for whom and with whom we work - who have highly relevant experience, expertise, and viewpoints; and, because they will help to give all of our decision-making a more "global" emphasis, encouraging us all to put more emphasis on what works for AI as a whole, rather than what is in the interests of the AI entity that we represent.

In summary, we believe these proposals will enable us to strengthen the process of cultural change that AI needs to increase significantly the impact of their work in human rights.

AI will continue to evolve over the period of the next ISP, and we believe these proposals are well-suited to balancing governance and management during that evolution, helping to improve our impact. We look forward to your reactions to them.

Appendix I. Draft IEC Enabling Resolution on Governance and Democracy

The final version of this resolution which will appear in the ICM circular of resolutions and statute amendments may be formatted and arranged slightly differently from this text, depending on the ICM PrepCom's advice.

Text with grey background like this shows statute amendments.

The International Council:

RECOGNISING the need to create a global governance system for AI to implement the Integrated Strategic Plan, and the need to strengthen AI democracy (as required by 2007 ICM Decision P2),

Part A – Principles

DECIDES to adopt the following principles for the movement's democratic governance at all levels:

1. **Impact Focus:** The final and main objective of AI's governance is ensuring maximum human rights impact.
2. **Inclusiveness:** Internal and external stakeholders must be meaningfully involved in AI's governance.
3. **Diversity and Gender:** AI's governance bodies must be diverse and gender-sensitive.
4. **Quality Participation:** AI's discussion and decision-making culture must be based on competency, mutual trust, transparent, evidence-based information, open minds, a collaborative and constructive approach, and mutual respect.
5. **Transparency:** As a rule, all governance related information must be freely accessible to AI members. Confidentiality is the exception.
6. **Accountability:** All of AI's governance structures must be part of an internationally integrated accountability system.
7. **Effectiveness and Efficiency:** AI's governance structures, systems and processes must be as simple, clear and effective as possible in order to make best use of the movement's limited governance resources.

Part B - Mechanisms

In order to improve the movement's compliance with the above principles **DECIDES:**

2. Inclusiveness

- **Consultation:** Consulting relevant external stakeholders before making decisions will be standard and mandatory AI procedure, both at the national and international level. In each consultation, all AI entities participating will disclose which internal and external stakeholders were consulted and their feedback.
- **Advice:** Advisory committees and working groups at all levels, national boards, national AGMs, the IEC and the ICM always involve external stakeholders in order to make best use of their know-how, expertise and skills and in order to ensure that their perspectives and voices are heard when decisions are made.

3/4. Diversity and gender and quality participation

- All AI entities will have mechanisms in place to ensure that decision-making bodies have the right mix of knowledge, skills and experience, are diverse and gender balanced (e.g., through the use of nominations committees).

5. Transparency

- **Communication:** Normally, information about the status of pending governance decisions (e.g., when the decision is due to be made; what information it will be based on) will be freely available to AI members.
- **Open access:** Normally, discussions of pending decisions and feedback received in formal consultation processes will be freely available to AI members. In exceptional cases where confidentiality is of a crucial importance, the relevant governance entity can identify the consultation as confidential and restrict access accordingly.
- **Justification:** Each formal decision taken by an AI governance entity will contain the following elements: background and rationale of the decision, final text of the decision, validity and applicability of the decision explaining whom the decision is addressed to, whether the decision is a recommendation or binding, and whether the decision is for the international or the national levels or for both.

6. Accountability

- **Objectives:** Every strategic decision will include key performance indicators and benchmarks against which success can be measured. All Sections, Structures and the IS will agree, commit and set out in writing their contribution to the movement's strategic objectives, including benchmarks and key performance indicators.
- **Reporting:** The INGO Accountability Charter contains the minimum requirements for the accountability of all Sections, Structures and the IS. The IEC will ensure that all parts of AI report in ways that enable AI as a whole to fulfill the requirements of the Charter.
- **Non-Compliance:** AI entities which do not report as required or whose report shows that they do not fulfill their obligations towards the movement may have to face sanctions as decided upon by the IEC.

7. Effectiveness and efficiency.

- **Clarity of roles:** All AI entities ensure that all stakeholders participating in discussion, consultation and decision-making processes will be clear at all times about their roles. Each of these different participatory activities carries different access requirements, different rules of engagement and different responsibilities, which will always be made clear, transparent and explicit.
- **Strategy:** AI governance bodies will prioritize strategic decisionmaking.

Part C – Institutional changes

(i) Changes to the ICM

DECIDES that the ICM is AI's Global Governance Assembly, and that current participation will be extended to include up to 50 guests selected by the IEC, following advice from all parts of the movement. These guests will comprise both "rightsholders at risk" and external human rights activists.

DECIDES to amend Article 16 of the AI Statute to read:

16. The International Council shall consist of the members of the International Executive Committee and of representatives of sections and structures, **and of representatives of AI's international membership, as defined in the second paragraph of Article 15**, and shall meet at intervals of not more than two years on a date fixed by the International Executive Committee. Only representatives of sections and structures **and the international membership** shall have the right to vote at the International Council.

DECIDES to add Article 16a to the AI Statute:

16a. The international membership shall have the right to appoint one representative to the International Council. In addition, they may appoint:

more than 2,500 international members	1 representative
more than 15,000 international members	2 representatives

The system for electing the representatives for international members shall be defined by the International Executive Committee.

DECIDES to amend Article 17 of the AI Statute to read:

17. All sections and structures shall have the right to appoint one representative to the International Council. In addition, a section may appoint:

more than 250 members	1 representative
more than 2,500 members	2 representatives
more than 15,000 members	3 representatives
more than 40,000 members	4 representatives
more than 80,000 members	5 representatives

or, if a section so chooses:

10 – 49 groups	1 representative
50 – 99 groups	2 representatives
100 – 199 groups	3 representatives
200 – 399 groups	4 representatives
400 groups and over	5 representatives

DECIDES to amend ICM Standing Order 10.6 to read:

In addition to the number of representatives, a section or structure may nominate non-voting participants. The total size of any section delegation is limited to **six** participants. The total size of any structure delegation is limited to 3 participants.

(ii) Changes to the IEC

DECIDES that the IEC is AI's Global Governance Board

DECIDES to amend Article 30 of the AI Statute to read:

30. Members of the International Executive Committee, including the international treasurer, shall hold office for a period of four years and shall be eligible for re-election once. Their terms of office shall begin and end at the close of the International Council meeting.

Transition arrangements

Four regular members of the IEC shall be elected in 2011 and thereafter every four years; four regular members of the IEC shall be elected in 2013 and thereafter every four years. As a transitional measure the eight regular members of the IEC elected at the 2009 ICM shall draw lots to determine which four of them shall serve for two years and which four shall serve for four years. The international treasurer elected at the 2009 ICM shall serve for two years, and shall then be eligible for one further term on the IEC (either as a regular member or as treasurer).

DECIDES to amend Article 32 of the AI Statute to read:

32. In the event of **vacancies** occurring on the Committee, it may co-opt further **members** to fill the **vacancies** until the next meeting of the International Council, which shall elect such members as are necessary to replace members **(or their co-opted alternates) who are at the end of their terms** and to fill the **vacancies for the positions with two remaining years of office.**

DECIDES to renumber all statute articles accordingly.

(iii) Changes to the Chairs Forum

DECIDES that the Chairs Forum is AI's Global Governance Meeting and has the main task of agreeing the contributions of all AI entities to AI's global strategic objectives and of supporting the IEC in overseeing the performance of global management and of holding all AI entities accountable to each other as appropriate for delivery of AI's global strategies. The Global Governance meeting is also a venue for consultation and dialogue, leadership skill development, and cooperation across AI entities.

DECIDES that the terms of reference of the Chairs Forum will be amended to reflect this role, and to incorporate the participation of three voting representatives of AI's international membership and 15 non-voting "rightsholders at risk" and external human rights activists.

(iv) Creation of an AI Global Forum

DECIDES to create an AI Global Forum - an easily accessible online space for ongoing international governance related discussion and dialogue - and instructs the IEC to prepare firm proposals;

DECIDES that the operation of both the AI Global Forum and the existing AI intranet should be compatible with the seven principles in Part A above and that, in particular, all AI activists should have easy access to relevant parts of the Forum and the intranet.

(v) Creation of an International Nominations Committee

DECIDES to create an International Nominations Committee (INC), which shall consist of five members who shall be elected by the International Council in the same manner and subject to the

same conditions as provided for in Article 28 of the Statute for the IEC. The committee's role is to encourage a wide range of nominations for the IEC and other elected international positions, ensuring that all concerned are aware of the skills, competences needed for these positions, and that the field of nominees is diverse and gender-balanced.

DECIDES that the terms of reference of the International Nominations Committee shall be drafted by the IEC, circulated to the movement, and prepared for approval by the 2010 Chairs Forum

DECIDES that the initial terms of reference of the INC shall include making recommendations to the movement on:

- (a) whether the eight regular places on the IEC should be divided into quotas for IEC members with particular competences, experiences, or backgrounds;
- (b) whether the INC itself should have the right to nominate candidates for internationally elected posts to supplement the nominations of sections and structures
- (c) any other matters that the INC deems appropriate

Part D – Changes to AI's culture and practices at national and international level

INSTRUCTS the IEC to develop guidelines and binding minimum requirements for Sections' and Structures' national democratic governance, including the election of ICM delegates.

DECIDES that the boards of Sections and Structures should analyse and review their own national governance systems in the light of the principles adopted by this decision and should present, when needed, consistent reform proposals at their respective AGMs.

DECIDES that the Chairs Forum will provide a space for discussion, support and evaluation of the implementation of this decision at national level.

INSTRUCTS the IEC to initiate an analysis and change process in order to identify and modify entrenched and accepted behaviors at all levels in AI which risk undermining the effectiveness of AI's governance, including, but not limited to the areas of leadership, trust, openness, conflicts and power, and to ensure that this change process is underway before the next ICM.

Appendix II. The size of the ICM

The size of the ICM is very relevant to discussion about whether AI could hold the meeting each year. The figures for the last three years, together with some estimates of how it could be made smaller, are given below:

	2003	2005	2007
Number of sections and structures represented	78	68	67
Section and structure delegates	226	202	241
Prepcom + facilitators	13	12	13
IEC	9	9	9
IEC guests (presenters, speakers, etc)	14	18	14
IS staff	60	58	58
Interpreters	40	43	43
Volunteers	45	36	41
Total people at ICM	407	378	419
Reduction in number of S/S delegates if each delegation were limited to not more than three people	48	40	55
Optimistic 50% reduction in staff, volunteer, guests, and interpreters if meeting were half as long.	79.5	77.5	78
Estimated total size of scaled-down meeting	279.5	261	286

The IEC concludes from these figures that it is not possible to make the ICM small enough for the meeting to be held every year, unless one makes section and structure delegations unacceptably small. Even on the most optimistic assumptions, the ICM cannot be made much smaller than almost 300 people, and realistically it could easily be closer to 350 people. An annual meeting of this size would be prohibitively expensive and would result in too many of AI's resources being devoted to governance instead of action.

The IEC also concludes that the reduction in numbers which comes from limiting delegations to a maximum size of three people is sufficient to enable us to bring in representatives of international membership and enough outside voices (around 50 elected or appointed "rightsholders at risk" and human rights activists) to make a substantial difference to the quality of debate and decisionmaking at the ICM, provided that we keep the ICM as a biannual meeting.

Appendix III. The size of the Chairs Forum

The Chairs Forum is a much smaller meeting than the ICM. In recent years its size has been as shown in the table below. (It is not possible to give the size of the 2007 CF with any precision because the official list of participants does not distinguish between the CF and the Directors Forum with which it overlapped. The 2006 CF was untypical because it included additional section experts on use of force and sexual and reproductive rights. The figures below for 2008 are representative of a “normal” Chairs Forum.)

Chairs Forum size

	2008
Number of sections and structures represented	58
Section and structure delegates	58
Prepcom + facilitators	2
IEC	9
IEC guests (presenters, speakers, etc)	8
IS staff	13
Interpreters	9
Volunteers	0
Total people at Chairs Forum	99

The IEC envisages a modest increase in the size of the meeting by adding these extra participants:

Representatives of international members	2 or 3
Rightsholders and external activists	15

The IEC believes that the inclusion of these extra participants will have a significant impact on the meeting without making it unduly large, expensive, or resource-intensive.

Appendix IV: Voting rights at the ICM

The voting rights for sections with more than 3 votes at the 2007 were as follows:

ICM 2007 voting rights				
Section	Number of Members:	Number of Groups:	Number of Votes:	Rights allocation by:
Belgium (Francophone + Flemish)	26,875	475	6	Groups
Canada (French + English)	71,090	836	6	Groups
Denmark	80,832		6	Members
France	22,218	415	6	Groups
Germany	22,228	677	6	Groups
Italy	84,034	224	6	Members
Netherlands	294,125		6	Members
UK	176,728	910	6	Members
USA	297,382		6	Members
Australia	56,649	202	5	Members
Austria	70,727	123	5	Members
Norway	50,400	164	5	Members
Spain	44,004	93	5	Members
Sweden	66,844	214	5	Members
Finland	29,989		4	Members
Ireland	18,000	180	4	Members
Switzerland	35,535	90	4	Members

These figures show that if the maximum voting delegation size were limited to four, then 14 sections would lose votes and 23 places would be made available for rightsholders, etc. If the maximum voting delegation size were limited to three, then 17 sections would lose votes and 40 places would be made available.

In 2007, the total number of votes allocated to the 58 sections and structures was 174. If the maximum number of votes per delegation were limited to four, then the proportion of votes held by the largest 10 sections would fall from 34% to 26% (59 out of 174 to 40 out of 151). If the maximum number of votes per delegation were limited to three, the proportion of votes held by the largest 10 sections would fall to 22% (30 out of 134).

The effect on the percentage of delegates at the ICM from the largest sections would be slightly different because some sections choose to send additional non-voting delegates. Under the IEC proposal, the maximum delegation size would fall from eight to six, in line with the maximum number of votes falling from six to four.